The first volume of China and the World examines the relationship between China and the world from the angle of international relations.

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The second volume of China and the World examines the relationship between China and the world from the angle of business.

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Selected Articles

For a Broader Outlook at the Chinese Civilization

Although it is etymologically associated with spatial narrowness, parochialism can also be understood in relation to time. It can be said that an unfortunate example of temporal parochialism lies in the West’s perception of China, that not only limits its capacity to comprehend the depths of Chinese civilization, but also diminishes its ability to anticipate the future of Chinese society.

At best only the past 200 years of Chinese history have made some sort of impression upon the West’s collective memory. Compared to the four millennia that have shaped Chinese civilization, this is a narrow temporal span that unavoidably brings with it a distorted representation of the Middle Country.

Restricted by temporal insularity, the West’s recollection of China hardly goes beyond a decaying Qing dynasty (1644-1912), easily defeated in 1839 and 1856 during the First and Second Opium Wars, and whose Mandarins were forced to accept a system of territorial concessions.

This impression of power asymmetry favoring Europe and, later on, the United States of America, both invigorated by their Industrial Revolutions, runs deep. Photography and films, whose early developments took place in the 19th century, recorded and rapidly disseminated what was for China a century of decline. These new communication tools, concomitants of a technological transformation, consolidated a narrative in which the West appeared as the embodiment of modernity.

Having such an ingrained but fragmentary representation of China, and facing China’s rapid ascension following Deng Xiaoping’s “reform and opening up” four decades ago, the West is filled with surprise, if not disbelief. It would not be in such a shock if it were capable of a broader outlook at the Middle Country.

Any effort to enlarge the span of what is remembered about China, or, in other words, any serious attempt to understand the Chinese civilization, introduces a very different perspective. China’s ongoing ascent, its successes since 1978, and the ones that will certainly unfold in the foreseeable future, echo some patterns that have already structured the past two millennia.

In a sense, it is not China’s meteoric return to a central position in global affairs that should be a cause for astonishment, but the fact that it was so rapidly marginalized following the Industrial Revolution.

The succession of Chinese dynasties that came after the Xia (2070-1600 BC) implies a long series of rises and falls. To this fundamental rhythm in Chinese history can be superimposed a cycle in which periods of opening up to the world and of closing off alternate. From an external perspective, and given China’s constant strategic weight, such an alternance between the country’s opening up and its closing off is highly consequential.

The opening up that Deng Xiaoping (1904-1997) initiated was, therefore, a variation on one of the leitmotifs of Chinese history. When these periods of intense exchanges with the outside world took place, in some occurrences lasting several hundred years, China’s material conditions looked highly advantageous by comparison with her known economic partners.

The Silk Road phenomenon, the Tang dynasty, the Song dynasty, and the early Ming period all share the common characteristic of Chinese engagement with the world.

Ferdinand von Richthofen (1833-1905) first used the “Silk Road” expression in 1877 to describe the commercial exchanges between the Han dynasty (202 BC-220 AD) and the Roman Empire. Before him, Edward Gibbon (1737- 1794) had already noted in The Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire the importance of the trade in which “silk was immediately delivered to the Romans by the Persian merchants”1.

It is a material good that was traded across Eurasia which has been used retrospectively to describe this early Sino-European connection, and which became a symbol of the relationship between China and the world. In Gibbon’s words, silk was a good that epitomized “rare and elegant luxury”, and whose origin was the Middle Country.

In the chapter previously quoted, Edward Gibbon remarked that “Aurelian complained that a pound of silk was sold in Rome for twelve ounces of gold”. In his Natural History, Pliny the Elder (AD 23-79) calls the inhabitants of northern China the Seres, associating them with the land of Serica, or silk2.

The ubiquity of Richthofen’s formula, which has evolved into a metaphor for cross-fertilization between civilizations, is a phenomenon reminiscent of Marcel Proust (1871-1922). “The past is hidden somewhere outside the realm, beyond the reach of intellect, in some material object which we do not suspect”, wrote Proust in Swann’s Way3. By evoking silk, time is being dilated so the colors, perfumes, and sounds of ancient worlds reappear.

The second illustration of China’s engagement with the world came four centuries after the collapse of the Han dynasty.

The Tang dynasty (618-907) reached a level of affluence that was inseparable from its cosmopolitanism. The title of Mark Edward Lewis’ book on the dynasty that Emperor Gaozu (566-635) established is revealing: China’s Cosmopoli tan Empire4. It is, however, The Golden Peaches of Samarkand, authored by Edward H. Schafer (1913-1991) almost 60 years ago, that remains the most insightful guide to appreciate the society that was centered around Chang’an’s magnificence.

Schafer set the scene:

How Tang China contributed her arts and manners to her neighbors of the medieval Far East, especially to Japan, Korea, Turkestan, Tibet, and Annam, is a rather well-known story. [...] China also played the role of cultural go-between, transmitting the arts of the countries of the West to those of the East [...] The material imports of Tang are not so well known [...].

These imports are the subject of Schafer’s research. He illustrates how Tang China could afford luxury exotic goods, be it horses, leather goods, furs, weapons, ivory, rare woods, drugs, aromatics, textiles, gemstones, industrial minerals, or “dancing girls from the West”5.

It would not have surprised the author of The Golden Peaches of Samarkand to discover that today’s Italian, French, or American luxury brands are increasingly dependent on Chinese consumers.

A further significant period, although slightly less studied by sinologists, is the period spanning the Song dynasty (960-1279). Some analysts, inspired by the work of French historian Fernand Braudel (1902-1985), coined the term “Asian Mediterranean” to capture this geopolitical configuration6. The coastal city of Quanzhou, today in the north of Xiamen, played a pivotal role during this period.

In Records of Foreign People, Zhao Rukuo (1170-1231), the supervisor of maritime trade in Quanzhou, mentioned 58 countries and regions which were doing business in the Chinese port. Notable presences included Africa, the Mediterranean region – Sicily (Sijialiye) –, and the Arab world from Egypt to the Arabian Peninsula. Among the 47 products that he listed as traded goods was, for example, the famous aromatic resin frankincense (ruxiang), which came from Arabia (dashi) to China through Palembang7.

Known as zayton to Marco Polo (1254-1324), Quanzhou left a most positive impression upon the Venetian traveler:

[...] zayton, frequented by all the ships of India, which bring thither spicery and all other kinds of costly wares. It is the port also that is frequented by all the merchants of Manzi [N.B., Polo evokes here the south of China as opposed to its north, Cathay], for hither is imported the most astonishing quantity of goods and of precious stones and pearls, and from this they are distributed all over Manzi. And I assure you that for one shipload of pepper that goes to Alexandria or elsewhere, destined for Christendom, there come a hundred such, aye and more too, to this haven of zayton; for it is one of the two greatest havens in the world of commerce8.

Although he was accused by some of exaggeration, Marco Polo was simply describing genuine opulence. Contemporary Japanese historian Yoshinobu Shiba has meticulously shown in Commerce and Society in Song China that the advancement and prosperity of the dynasty founded by Emperor Taizu (927-976) was unparalleled9. Marco Polo, entering the Far East at the very beginning of the Yuan dynasty (1271-1368), could still witness the splendors of the Song.

The main player of the fourth example of external engagement, which took place at the beginning of the Ming dynasty (1368-1644), is Zheng He (1371-1435), eunuch, diplomat and explorer. Ordered by Emperor Yongle (1360-1424), Zheng He’s seven maritime expeditions are a testimony to China’s might at the dawn of the 15th century.

Zheng He’s voyages preceded both the explorations of Christopher Columbus (1451-1506) and Vasco da Gama (1460-1524), and the navigation technology that underpinned them, as well as the logistics that surrounded them, were well ahead of those of the European navigators. To understand the material resources that were available to him, one must only consider that at one point Zheng He commanded a fleet of around 28,000 sailors and reached the far away coasts of Eastern Africa.

The Overall Survey of the Ocean’s Shores10 that Zheng He’s companion and Arabic interpreter Ma Huan (1380- 1460) composed is a crucial document in grasping the extent of the early Ming’s projection outside its own space. However, Hong Xi (1378-1425), the fourth Emperor of the Ming dynasty, halted this sequence of explorations. Within his two-year reign, the fleet that had sailed Zheng He across the Indian Ocean was abandoned. In this case, the alternation between opening up and closing off took place in a relatively short period of time.

It is evident in its long history that the Middle Country had successful engagements with the world long before its 20th century opening up. These engagements could take the form of diplomatic, political, or cultural interactions, but they were often connected with economic exchanges that have obviously played an important role in the making of China. Traditionally, Chinese society was divided into four categories: the scholars (shi), the farmers (nong), the craftsmen (gong) and the merchants (shang). Within the framework of Confucian ethics, the merchants are considered to have been regarded with suspicion. Nevertheless, their function was recognized and valued.

The title of Wu Jingzi’s (1701-1754) novel, The Scholars (Rulinwaishi), explicitly indicates its main theme. While Wu’s scholars and officials are presented with humor, merchants constitute one of the book’s leitmotifs. Wu’s wit is in full play when he narrates their financial support to candidates preparing for imperial examination, the key to access coveted positions in the celestial bureaucracy11. In a different context two centuries later, Qian Zhongshu (1910-1998) also amused his readers with the games, pedantic and often futile, surrounding academia12.

The panoramic painting Along the River During the Qingming Festival (Qingming Shanghe Tu) also introduces an inspiring vision of economic exchanges. The urban life of the Song Period was captured by Zhang Zeduan (1085- 1145) in a five-meter-long scroll. Viewing it is equivalent to traveling back 1,000 years in time. Depending on their interests – and their mood – the historian aesthete can focus on the architecture, for example the bridges’ design; the boat technology; the variety of craftsmanship; the urban layout; or the clothing of the 764 characters portrayed by the artist. However, Zhang’s creation is not about a person or an isolated object; he painted social life and the commercial exchanges it brings about. Zhang’s brush does not hide business nor disdain it. Rather, it elevates material transactions to the status of indispensable elements to social harmony.

Anyone familiar with contemporary Chinese society would be aware of the business acumen and entrepreneurial spirit of the Zhejiang traders, as well as those from Fujian or Guangdong. But, long before them, the Shanxi merchants or those of Huizhou in Anhui Province were provided enough space to create material wealth that, in many cases, supported craftsmanship and art in an extraordinary manner.

The Shanxi merchants (jinshang) thrived during the last two Chinese dynasties, going beyond traditional commercial exchanges of goods. They were able to develop financial activities which brought them close to modern banking, which is inseparable from capitalism. Since the wealth they accumulated was spent on luxurious constructions, it is still visible across the Shanxi province, such as in the Wang Family’s Grand Courtyard (Wang jiadayuan).

Aside from painting and architecture, the prosperity that materialized in China through opening up and commerce can be seen in the works of its literati. Following the patient labor of Stephen Owen13, Chinese and non-Chinese alike can now appreciate the literary production of the Tang dynasty. The very existence of such a corpus is telling. Over 48,900 poems written by over 2,200 authors have survived the passage of time, as recorded in the Complete Tang Poems (Quan Tangshi) commissioned by Kangxi (1654-1722). Three elements were logically needed for such a phenomenon to happen. It presupposed a dynasty able to nurture such a large number of poets. It implied that their artistic production would be of such a quality that it would transcend the flow of centuries. And, last but not least, it required that the literati who followed would join in the appreciation of such a creative feast.

A later indicator of China’s material advancement is the Dream of the Red Chamber (Honglou Meng). In his description of 18th century Qing social dynamics, and his rendering of human psychology and interactions, Cao Xueqin (1715-1764) penned a novel that anticipated Balzac (1799- 1850) and Proust. Dream of the Red Chamber demonstrates an aesthetic of luxury. It shows a lifestyle where clothing, jewels, food, architecture, and furniture are as exquisite as the Chinese characters that Cao Xueqin uses to give them a literary existence.

It is no coincidence that in the eighties, following Deng Xiaoping’s second revolution, China’s central television made a production of Dream of the Red Chamber, which received widespread applause. With Chen Xiaoxu (1965- 2007) starring as Lin Daiyu, Cao’s beautiful and intelligent tragic heroine, the production was an indication that China had broken with the dark years of the Cultural Revolution. Marco Polo is once again a precious eyewitness on China’s past achievements. Talking about Kinsay, today’s Hangzhou, he couldn’t be clearer: “I will enter into particulars about Kinsay’s magnificence; and these are well worth the telling, for the city is beyond dispute the finest and the noblest in the world”14. Could he be believed upon his return to Venice? He certainly triggered curiosity about the other edge of the Eurasian continent.

In 1954, Joseph Needham posed what is known as “Needham’s Grand Question”. Needham (1900-1995) was one of the 20th century’s most significant sinologists, who explored Chinese mathematics, physics, chemistry, biology, language, and logic in the most rigorous way in his ongoing series of books, Science and Civilization in China. He stated: “I believe that the more you know about Chinese civilization, the more odd it seems that modern science and technology did not develop there”15. This is “Needham’s Grand Question”, and a problem that is felt in proportion to one’s real knowledge of China’s past.

Needham hypothesized that it was Chinese feudal bureaucracy which had been an obstacle to China leading the entry into technological modernity. From another perspective, it can also be argued that what led Europe to the Industrial Revolution was the combination of truly unique elements. The conversation around “Needham’s Grand Question” is certainly not closed.

However, with the end of Imperial China in 1911, and the establishment of the People’s Republic of China in 1949, the Middle Country has entered a new phase in which the causes of its marginalization have been removed. The People’s Republic of China is a new political incarnation of the Chinese civilization, which has succeeded in eradicating the feudalism that caused the Old Regime to decay. Chinese society is once again open to the world and has never been more entrepreneurial and creative. This should be the premise for the observer wishing to anticipate China’s future.

To a certain extent, China’s rejuvenation, which is reminiscent of some of China’s past successes, is completed. However, should the “reform and opening up” be continued, and the creativity of the Chinese people be fostered by the appropriate socio-political environment, a cultural and artistic renaissance will unfold in China and enrich our world in the decades to come.

David Gosset, sinologist, founder of the Europe-China Forum (2002) and of the China-Europe-America Global Initiative (2021, http://www. ourglobalinitiative.com/en

1 E. Gibbon, The Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire. Volume VI, England-Franklin, TN, Naxos Audiobooks Ltd., 2014.

2 G. Plinius Secundus and H. Rackham, Natural history: In 10 volumes. 2: Books 3-7, Cambridge, Mass., Harvard Univ. Press, 2006.

3 M. Proust, Remembrance of Things Past, New York, Vintage Books, 1982.

4 M.E. Lewis, China’s Cosmopolitan Empire: The Tang Dynasty, 1. History of imperial China, Cambridge, Mass., The Belknap Press of Harvard Univ. Press, 2012.

5 E.H. Schafer, The Golden Peaches of Samarkand: A Study of T’ang Exotics, Berkeley, CA, Univ. of California Press, 1985.

6 F. Gipouloux, The Asian Mediterranean: Port Cities and Trading Networks in China, Japan and South Asia, 13th-21st Century, Cheltenham, UK, Edward Elgar, 2011.

7 L.C. Hopkins, “Chau Ju-Kua: His Work on the Chinese and Arab Trade in the Twelfth and Thirteenth Centuries, Entitled Chu Fan Chï. Translated from the Chinese and Annotated by Friedrich Hirth and W.

W. Rockhill. St. Petersburg: Printing Office of the Imperial Academy of Sciences, 1912”, Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society, 44, 1912, 4, pp. 1114-1117.

8 M. Polo, H. Yule, and H. Cordier, The Travels of Marco Polo: The Complete Yule-Cordier Edition: Including the Unabridged Third Edition (1903) of Henry Yule’s Annotated Translation, as Revised by Henri Cordier, Together with Cordier’s Later Volume of Notes and Addenda (1920), New York, Dover Publications, 1993. Like for Paul Pelliot’s notes on The Overall Survey of the Ocean’s Shores, his comments on the Yule edition stand as a monument of erudite sinology: Notes on Marco Polo, Paris, 1959 (posthumous publication).

9 Y. Shiba and M. Elvin, Commerce and Society in Sung China, Mich- igan abstracts of Chinese and Japanese works on Chinese history No. 2, Ann Arbor, University of Michigan, Center for Chinese Studies, 1970.

10 H. Ma, C. Feng, and J.V.G. Mills, Ying-Yai Sheng-Lan = The Overall Survey of the Ocean’s Shores’-1433, Bangkok, White Lotus Press, 1997. The reader who wishes to have a taste of haute sinology would greatly enjoy the perusing of P. Pelliot (1878-1945), Les grands voyages maritimes chinois au début du XVe siècle, in T’oung Pao, Vol. 30, 1933.

11 吴敬梓 and G. Yang, The Scholars, Rockville, MD, Silk Pagoda, 2006. The reader who is interested in the “celestial bureaucracy” can refer to E. Balazs, Bureaucratie céleste, Paris, Gallimard, 1968.

12 z. Qian, J. Kelly, and N.K. Mao, Fortress Besieged = Wei Cheng, New York, New Directions, 2004.

13 F. Du and S. Owen, The Poetry of Du Fu, Boston, De Gruyter, 2015. This can serve as an introduction to the work of Stephen Owen, the most solid bridge between the Tang and the contemporary world.

14 M. Polo, H. Yule, and H. Cordier, The Travels of Marco Polo, cit.

15 J. Needham, Science and Society in Ancient China, London, Watts & Co., 1947.

Chinese Overseas Investments and Multilateralism

It is impossible to imagine multilateralism without foreign direct investments (FDI), free movement of capital across borders, equal treatment of foreign and domestic companies, and openness for technological transfers.

China is a relatively new player in the international FDI arena. Historically, the privilege of playing a role in this market belonged to the most developed countries. While newcomers always come with enthusiasm, they are accepted with prejudice. Many developed countries, including the US and European Union (EU) countries, have introduced procedures for screening the FDI coming from China, as well as restrictions for market entry in sectors linked to national security and high technology sectors. Many studies have fuelled political and public scepticism about Chinese overseas investments, while others have focused on the limitations of FDI entry to the Chinese market. Most of their conclusions come from the lack of a common theory and research on the nature and impact of Chinese FDI abroad and foreign investments in China.

This report essay aims to answer the following questions:

–Why have Chinese outward investments become a concern for some countries?

–Is conventional FDI theory sufficient to explain Chinese FDI?

–What makes Chinese investments abroad specific?

In answering these questions, we will elaborate on several policy recommendations for building a common understanding and unlocking the potential of FDI from and to China. This will contribute to strengthening the multilateralism in a challenging political landscape.

Chinese investments in the context of global investment flows

China’s growing economic potential, coupled with an active economic policy, hassled to expansion in external trade, and recently in FDI. Chinese overseas investments have accelerated in the last two decades. In 2000 the outward investments were 4.9 billion $, while in 2019 they reached 97 billion $. The liberal regime and unrestricted access to foreign direct investment flows in the recipient countries have created a favourable environment for Chinese companies to settle abroad, establishing businesses and control over local companies.

Both FDI inflow and outflow remain unstable. They increased after the global financial crisis, but have declined in the last two years.

The scope and the role of Chinese overseas investments is exaggerated. In 2019, Chinese FDI represented only 5% of the global FDI outflow, while the FDI of the EU contributed 20%. Chinese FDI outflow is below the huge potential of the economy, at only 0.68% of the GDP. It is still marginal if compared to the EU, where the FDI outflow is 12% of GDP.

Though some countries criticise China for being not opened enough for FDI, China remains a net importer of FDI with 155.8 billion $ inflow and 97.8 billion $ outflow in 2019. China is the second largest recipient of FDI in the world.

Chinese FDI played an important role during and after the global financial crisis, when FDI from USA and the EU contracted significantly. Thanks to Chinese investments, part of the global investment gap was filled in. Looking at post- COVID economic developments, the hope is that Chinese investments abroad will once again support global economic recovery, and in particular the EU economy. China’s economy has recovered earlier than other large economies, and its economic growth has accelerated to double-digit levels (GDP growth for the first quarter of 2021 is 18.3%).

What is specific about Chinese overseas investments?

The nature, the economic structure and the factors driving Chinese investment abroad are specific. The outflow comprises FDI from large companies, as well as from small and micro companies. Their economic potential and impact on the recipient economies is different. The large investments receive a lot of scientific and political interest, while the impact of the smaller ones remains undervalued.  

State-owned enterprises prevail in the Chinese FDI outflow, and the government is encouraging them to become internationalised. This creates the perception of risk in the recipient countries.

Economic literature is focused on Chinese investments in developed regions, mainly the US and the EU, but most of the Chinese investments are directed to Asia (55.6% to Hong Kong). A relatively small portion of the FDI is directed to the EU and US. There is also a huge outflow to special jurisdictions and offshore zones.

Another feature of Chinese investments abroad, identified in most studies, is that the penetration and expansion of markets is a major driver for them (Buckley, Clegg, Cross, Liu, Voss and Zheng, 2007). In developing countries, the main motivation is defined as the demand for raw materials. Some studies point to cultural factors and good political relations with countries which motivate Chinese investments abroad (Buckley et al., 2007; Cheng and Ma, 2008).

One of the reasons for the scepticism against Chinese investments abroad is China’s active foreign economic policy in encouraging companies, including SOEs, to invest abroad. Both inward and outward investments are subject to an active policy. While in classical FDI theory investment abroad is considered a spontaneous process that is a result of market forces, Chinese inward and outward investments are perceived as a process managed not by the market but by the government. This creates the perception of risk and a threat to the internal market and national security of the recipient country. Certainly, many countries welcome Chinese FDI and report a positive impact on their economies.

The theoretical weakness in explaining Chinese overseas investment

Investments from developing countries to developed ones have increased since the beginning of the 21st century. The growth of FDI has stimulated the development of the theory, and in recent years it has been saturated with changes requiring scientific explanation. Several important changes challenge the traditional understanding of FDI. Conventional theory deals mainly with the causes and factors that motivate companies from developed countries to invest in less developed countries. In recent decades, flows of investments have increased significantly from emerging market economies to advanced economies, a process that has expanded particularly since the financial crisis.

The global investment flows have changed, both in direction and in nature. The new trend is that their contribution to the economy is measured not only by overall size and job creation, but to a large extent by their digital potential. It is logical to expect that the advancement of Chinese digital transformation will shape future digitalisation related investments. Digitalisation, however, creates a sense of a risk. In some countries, the perception of risk transforms into restrictive policies that try to limit the access of highly digitalised foreign companies to the national economies. According to the theory, technological progress is one of the main factors moving investments from more advanced to the less advanced economies – a perceived risk for the recipient country that leads to regulation and restrictions to access. Technological progress becomes a negative factor for the globalisation of investments in this fundamentally important part of economic progress and globalisation.

The internal structure of FDI has also changed. The channels of penetration have been digitized, and political and public opinion on investment has shifted. More and more restrictions are being introduced. In search of an explanation for the new phenomena in FDI, a wave of empirical research was done after the global financial crisis on Chinese investments in individual countries and regions.

Knowledge, technology, and capital flows have emerged from less developed to more developed countries. The group of multinationals has changed, with Asian companies growing increasingly involved. Their behaviour has changed according to the complex environment for their investments and the introduction of monitoring and regulatory constraints. This is the case with Chinese investment, especially its expansion after the financial crisis.

Defining Chinese investments within classical theories has proven challenging. Chinese investments must be considered in the context of the Chinese economic model, which is too different to explain with conventional market economy theories. The symbiosis of large State-owned companies with private companies, as well as small and medium-sized enterprises, has an impact on the structure of China’s FDI outflow. Internationalisation of these different type of companies is based on different factors.

Academic literature has not reached a consensus on these factors. However, by examining the activities of Chinese companies abroad, we can identify the main motives and their specificity. According to Yin-Wong Cheung and Xingwang Qian (2008), the motives behind Chinese investments in developed and developing countries should be distinguished. Their research, as well as that of others, demonstrates that Chinese investments are heterogeneous in their destinations, structure, motivation, and effectiveness.

Most of the research shows that production efficiency is a less critical motive for the internationalization of Chinese multinationals. Since the production costs in China are relatively small, they would not be able to develop a competitive advantage abroad based on efficiency. A number of studies have shown poor efficiency and low profits in Chinese investments abroad. Therefore, it is difficult to justify their motivation within conventional market thinking, and the explanation exists rather in the non-market nature of some Chinese investments.

The studies on Chinese outward investments point to differences in the scope, structure, and impact in developed and developing economies. The positive impact of Chinese investments is more significant in developing countries.

A comparison of studies of conventional theory with those of leading Chinese economists shows significant differences in understanding the nature, measurement, role, and policy of foreign investments. This is also related to the nature of the Chinese economic model, which is still not understood within the classical paradigm of the free market economy. It is a market economy largely controlled and managed by the State, and this also applies to foreign investments in China and Chinese investments abroad.

Traditionally, inward and outward FDI is subject to governmental economic policy in free market economies as well. The involvement of the State in the cross-border movement of capital is not new. Recently, the US administration proposed a global tax on multinational companies. The initiative was supported by many other governments as well.

The “America First” policy includes measures to hold the investments of American companies at home, while after the global financial crisis the EU established a fund to compensate for the loss of jobs due to investments abroad. In both cases, these policies have explicit and well-justified reasons. In the first case, it is to prevent the drain of capital, and in the second – the compensation of job losses. In the case of Chinese investments abroad, the involvement of the State is self-explanatory, since this is the nature of its economic model.

When considering FDI in China, the prevailing factor is access to market, and in most cases overseas investors coming from developed market economies do not receive support from their governments. The companies look for further expansion in the large and growing Chinese internal market. Studies on FDI in China suggest that foreign-controlled companies focus their sales on the domestic market, and very few of them contribute to exports from the country. The econometric tests confirm a high positive impact of foreign investments in China, particularly in the regions with a higher concentration of FDI. Foreign companies invest in China most often in the form of green field investments, as opposed to investments in the most developed countries, where most FDI is realized in the form of acquisitions of shares in existing companies (M&A).

One of the sources of concern for developed countries regarding Chinese FDI policy is the perception of lack of reciprocity. EU investments in China are only 8.3% of the total inward foreign investments. The feeling is that foreign investors in China face more restrictions than Chinese investors abroad. This statement is difficult to prove from the available data. The data provided by the National Bureau of Statistics continuously indicate that foreign companies in China are performing better than the total for the enterprise sector. For example, “in the first quarter, the value added of State holding enterprises was up by 16.9 percent year on year; that of share-holding enterprises was up by 23.7 percent year on year; that of enterprises funded by foreign investors was up by 29.2 percent year on year”1.

One of the problems in analysing Chinese investments is the limited information available. An objective assessment needs in-depth and representative empirical research, the results of which can navigate valuations and serve as a reliable basis for foreign investment policy. Furthermore, the Chinese definition of foreign investments does not comply with the definition of the International Monetary Fund and OECD, which are broadly used for their analysis2.

The studies are focused on particular investments and rarely on the entire Chinese FDI and its impact on the recipient economy.

How to unlock the potential of FDI

Global FDI flows are changing their content, sources, and directions. Though increasing, the FDI from China is still small compared to the size and potential of the economy. Unlocking this potential requires political efforts from both the source and the beneficiary countries. Bilateral and multilateral dialogue would contribute to the convergence of FDI policies. This is a possible topic of consideration for future WTO reform.

Limiting restrictions, setting up multilateral rules for multinational companies and guaranteeing equal treatment of foreign and domestic investors should be the main topics on the global FDI agenda. In addition, cross-border green investments may be encouraged and facilitated by global agreement on climate change. To address the national security concerns about cross-border digitalisation and technological transfer, there is a need for clear global regulation.

Literature review and data analysis reveal the specific characteristics of the Chinese overseas investments. It is difficult to match the conventional understanding of FDI as spontaneous market-driven investments with the planned and managed Chinese FDI model. The misunderstanding is fuelled by poor data and limited studies on the impact of those investments.

Ms. Daniela Bobeva is the former vice Prime Minister of Bulgaria.

1   National Bureau of Statistics of China (stats.gov.cn).

2 OECD, Benchmark Definition of Foreign Direct Investment, Fourth edition, 2008

Role of Business in Supporting a Low Carbon Future

Introduction

China ramped up its climate ambition well before the announcement by President Xi Jinping in September 2020 that the country aims to achieve carbon neutrality by 2060 and peak emissions by 2030. Since China is responsible for 28% of global annual greenhouse gas emissions, the country has a vital role to play in the global effort to fight climate change. The private sector in turn holds the key to reaching net zero by 2060. This essay explores the drivers of change that will inform the role of the private sector in the new era. It dissects the evolution of the private sector in China and suggests that the current digital and green industrial revolutions present historic opportunities for businesses throughout the economy to leverage.

Given the sheer scale and size of the Chinese economy, it will be a difficult and challenging transition. However, China has demonstrated a successful track record of delivering on major policy initiatives over a long period, such as a significant ramp up in its renewable energy footprint, improving energy efficiency, pollution reduction in all major cities, as well as alleviating extreme poverty including in rural areas. The goal of net zero by 2060 provides a unified new long-term strategy for collective action by the private sector, particularly the financial system.

If China succeeds with the goal of net zero by 2060, the country will have gone from the largest carbon emitter on the planet to bringing its emissions into balance in less than 40 years.

Despite the successes of the Chinese economy, it has shown some vulnerabilities as it now enters a critical new stage defined by slower economic growth. China has taken concrete steps to steer the economy away from resource extraction and low value added, low wage manufacturing to a high tech, high productivity economy. In doing so, it is making use of more active industrial policies, including the use of government subsidies such as tax breaks and direct State funding, mobilizing State owned entities, and intellectual property acquisition, to catchup with the leading technology companies in the developed world. These government actions are not without controversy, and they are likely to deepen existing tensions between western powers and China about its use of active industrial policy to gain competitive advantages over its global peers.

This journey will therefore be fraught with challenges, but the green and digital revolutions underway hold great promise for the expanded role of the private sector. The new wave of technological change presents opportunities that could provide long term productivity boosts to many sectors in the economy.

The goal of achieving carbon neutrality in the decades ahead will require interventions at policy making level across all markets. To succeed in this effort, governments across the world have the responsibility to define the “new rules of the game”. By designing new policies, regulations, and standards to curb emissions, national governments will be the main driving force in creating an enabling environment. Once governments have enacted a clear and transparent regulatory environment, the private sector knows what is expected and can accelerate its contribution to de-carbonization. Private companies always prefer and require a stable and predictable environment in order to make their investment decisions. Once such an environment exists, the private sector can play a leading and indispensable role by leveraging its vast resources to fight climate change. Most industries, including energy, agriculture, transport, logistics, and packaging require transformation on a global scale. The private sector will need to harness the powers of innovation, new approaches and business models, and new technology to succeed with this transition.

COVID-19 was initially seen as a major threat and setback to global efforts to fight climate change. Fortunately there are encouraging signs that the pandemic seems to have catalysed new urgency and momentum, driven by the confluence of regulatory pressure, investment preferences by asset managers, and consumer choices. The evidence suggests that global demand for sustainable products and solutions has reached new heights. This shift in consumer attitudes is visible across many industries, ranging from fast moving consumer goods, to fashion, to electric vehicles. Customers are choosing energy efficient solutions. There is now widespread optimism that the development of the green economy could directly boost GDP growth and employment.

2015 – A year of historic significance in redefining the role of business

In many respects, 2015 was a landmark year for multilateralism and will be remembered as a critical year in redefining the role of the private sector in the economy. The United Nations (UN) convened the Addis Ababa Financing for Development Conference, which was the first of three landmark moments in 2015 that laid the foundations for a low carbon and more sustainable future. This representative gathering of heads of State, multilateral development banks, the business sector, non-governmental organizations, (NGOs) and civil society produced a new framework for financing sustainable development which aligns all financing flows and policies with economic, social, and environmental priorities. At the heart of the deliberations were strategies to unlock larger volumes of private capital for development. The Consensus reached was that more private finance was needed in support of sustainable development. The outcome, called the Addis Ababa Action Agenda (AAAA), marked a turning point in international collaboration on development, placing the private sector at the centre. Prior to 2015, development finance was largely seen as the domain of governments, development finance institutions (DFIs), official development assistance (ODA), and bilateral donors. The new framework identified a broad range of public-private and blended finance tools to ramp up the scale of financing required for development and poverty alleviation.

The second landmark moment of 2015 was the adoption of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) at the UN General Assembly. The SDGs are 17 broad, interlinked goals which require, amongst other things, a wide-ranging transformation of national energy, transport, and other infrastructure systems. These goals have since become the blueprint for the global development agenda, positioning economic well-being, social inclusion, and environmental sustainability as closely interconnected.

The third ground-breaking moment of 2015 was the adoption of the Paris Treaty on Climate Change, a set of legally binding commitments on all of its 196 signatories, who committed themselves to a pathway to a low carbon economy. Since then, governments have adopted new strategies and plans for reorienting their economies, and private companies have adapted their business models. Significant new investments by the private sector were made in renewable energy, energy efficiency, and clean mobility throughout the world to support this transition, especially in China. Development finance institutions and multilateral development banks have also re-oriented their lending to support low carbon intensive investments. MDBs, for example, have begun to map every single project to a specific or multiple SDGs before making any investment decisions. Despite this major spike in new investments, substantial gaps remain relative to the financing required to meet the investment targets in most countries. The pledges made by the private sector have also fallen well short of the targets. In short, progress in meeting the obligations from the Paris Treaty has been slow and disappointing.

2015 also saw the establishment of two new multilateral development banks, both headquartered in China, namely the Asia Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) and the BRICS-led (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa) New Development Bank (NDB). Their formation marked a turning point for China, as the country adopted a more assertive position on the global stage. Armed with a subscribed capital base of 100 bn $ and 50 bn $ respectively, these institutions have grown rapidly from the start-up phase in 2015 to reach approved loan books of over 25 bn $ each by June 2021. From the onset, these two banks chose to extend loans and other financial instruments to the private sector in a direct departure from the traditional MDB model of providing loans mainly to governments and State-owned entities.

Informed by these developments, 2015 also signalled a new approach for MDBs, as they identified the mobilization of private sector capital and co-financing of infrastructure projects with the private sector as their most urgent task. Despite the growing need for accelerated investment in sustainable infrastructure, the scale of such investment by private funds and institutional investors remains staggeringly low. Multilateral development banks are part of the global financial ecosystem. However, they have a unique role to play in setting norms and standards for sustainable finance, and they often act as pioneers of new financial instruments such as blended finance and green finance. Whilst they hold great potential, these green financial instruments still remain a relatively small part of the overall investment universe.

A fifth significant moment of 2015 was the announcement of the “Made in China 2025” initiative. Essentially this is a State-led industrial policy that seeks to make China a dominant player in global high technology manufacturing. Throughout the 40 years of reform and open up, industrial policy in some form or another permeated the Chinese economic development strategy. The explicit aim of China’s industrial policy is to nudge the economy towards its strategic and priority sectors. Industrial policy continues to be actively used to steer the real economy, although it has taken a “lighter touch” in recent times. In short, government interventions are probably less intrusive than before, though nevertheless quite pervasive in the economy.

The “Made in China 2025” program aims to upgrade China’s manufacturing base by rapidly developing high technology industries such as electric cars and other new energy vehicles, next generation information technology and tele- communications, advanced robotics, and artificial intelligence (AI). Chinese policymakers are said to have drawn inspiration from Germany, where the government adopted an Industry 4.0 Development Plan. The objective of this new variant of Chinese industrial policy is to push the economy through this difficult transition to a higher value-add, higher productivity economy. Unlike previous versions of its industrial policy, the private sector is seen as the major driver of the “Made in China 2025” initiative, since much of the experience in AI and smart telecommunications 5G networks lies in the private sector and not in State-owned enterprises (SOEs).

These five factors are some of the most important developments of 2015 which ushered in a special focus and attention on the critical role of private sector in economic development in China and beyond.

The slow, gradual, and steady rise of the private sector in China

Prior to 1978, the private sector in China was virtually non-existent. During the period of reform and opening-up, the country underwent vast and fundamental changes to its economic system. Despite the breadth and depth of these reforms, it was not done in a big-bang fashion. Instead it was characterized by gradualism and experimentation, in keeping with the spirit of Deng Xiaoping’s famous statement of “crossing the river by feeling the stones”. The establishment of special economic zones (SEZ) typified the gradualism, with the government piloting new reforms in contained areas before replicating them on a larger scale. Although the market was given a more important role in resource allocation, the State has maintained a strong role.

More than 750 million people were lifted out of poverty as a result, and the country posted a prolonged period of double-digit economic growth. The economic reforms of the past three decades significantly reduced the role of SOEs in the economy, but they still account for a third of GDP. The path of creating a bigger role for the private sector went through several phases. It started with the constitutional amendment passed by the National People’s Congress in 1978 authorizing family businesses. However, this regulation restricted employment to no more than seven family members. It is remarkable how far China has come today, given these unusual provisions on the statutes that existed just 40 years ago. The government did not promulgate regulations allowing private corporations until 1988, a full decade into the reform and opening-up process. The Chinese authorities then expanded the scope of businesses open to private firms gradually over the following years. Before then, the private sector was mostly small scale and informal, and the larger industrial and financial sectors were dominated by SOEs. The Chinese economy had undergone a fundamental change from a complete reliance on State-owned and collective enterprises to a mixed economy where the private sector played a growing role. It was only in the 1990s that Chinese policymakers placed increased emphasis on building a market economy.

Property rights were vague, and ownership structures and governance mechanisms were underdeveloped. The policy environment was heavily biased in favour of State-owned enterprises, both in providing access to markets and to finance. Businesses cannot grow without access to finance. Throughout the 1990s, the financial system was dominated by four large State-owned banks which lent predominantly to State-owned enterprises. Only small portions of bank credit went to select private sector firms. It was only in 1999 that China passed a constitutional amendment which gave formal recognition to the country’s private sector.

Today, the private sector contributes approximately 70% of the GDP in China, and private firms are the dominant source of output, employment, and exports. Despite this progress, the State retains control of the so-called commanding heights of the economy through various mechanisms. These measures include continued dominant State ownership of critical sectors, widespread use of industrial policies, and a proliferation of government interventions designed to promote specific government objectives. State dominance of the banking sector has also remained unchanged, with the top four financial institutions, as well large development finance institutions or policy banks (most notably China Development Bank and the Agricultural Development Bank of China) fully owned by the government. Unlike in other jurisdictions, the privatization of State- owned enterprises has only been a minor contributor to the rise of private business. Private firms have displaced SOEs in many sectors, and many private firms have been significantly more efficient than SOEs in terms of return on assets. From a small-scale marginal presence in the 1980s, the private sector has become the dominant source of growth in output and employment over the past four decades. Many scholars argue that under President Xi Jinping there has been a renewed emphasis on State-owned enterprises, industrial policy, and the central role of the Communist Party in the economy. However, through the prism of a 40-year lens, the data and evidence suggest that the private sector has played and continues to play a dominant role in China’s economic transformation. Former World Bank Chief Economist Justin Lin refers to this combination as “effective government and efficient market”, which is unique to the Chinese model of economic development.

The race to net-zero

The world is in a race to reach net zero by 2050. Companies all over the world are embedding sustainability into their strategy and core business activity. Most of the world’s largest companies throughout the G20 and beyond have committed to net zero emissions by 2050. The financial sector has recognized that it has a special role to play and now needs to step up its efforts in support of the green transformation. MDBs are part of the global financial ecosystem. Therefore, they are critical providers of finance for global public goods, which by their nature require collective action across borders, country actors, and multilateral institutions. Global challenges such as climate change, pandemics, migration, and cyber security need to be addressed with shared strategies and efforts. MDBs are particularly well suited to partner with the private sector to facilitate carbon investments in sectors such as renewable energy, energy efficiency, and sustainable transport. They have a central role to play in steering the green transition. The financial sector and MDBs have a vital role to play in enabling countries to finance the infrastructure and energy systems of the future. In broad terms, the task today is to align the financial sector with the requirements of a net zero economy.

Challenges and potential obstacles on this journey

This new era is overshadowed by the challenges associated with the continuing COVID-19 pandemic and uncertainty over the direction of the US and China trade tensions. Failure to have the Comprehensive Agreement on Investment (CAI) between China and the European Union (EU) ratified adds to the global uncertainty, due a more strained relationship with the EU. In the past few years, the strategic competition and rivalry between the USA and China has intensified in many areas, ranging from trade, to finance, to technology, and spilling over into the security and military arenas. This has complicated the bilateral relationship. The lines between trade and investment policy and national security considerations are becoming increasingly blurred. Despite these challenges, there is a clear recognition that progress cannot be made in the fight to combat climate change unless there is strong collaboration between the troika of the USA, China, and the EU. It is generally hoped that the momentum towards COP26, to be held in Glasgow in November 2021, could lay the foundations for this greater collaboration.

In March 2018 China’s National People’s Congress passed a new Foreign Investment Law in an effort to confront the rising criticism it was facing regarding its unfair practices towards foreign enterprises. This law aims to address the common complaints from the foreign business community by explicitly banning forced technology transfers. Foreign firms complain that to invest or do business in China they must enter into joint ventures with Chinese firms under terms that require then to share sensitive intellectual property and advanced technological know-how. These companies argue that aspects of the Chinese industrial policies rely on such discriminatory treatment of foreign investors, forced technology transfers, intellectual property theft, and even cyber espionage. Much of the tension between China, the USA, and the EU over Chinese economic policies has revolved around the call for a level playing field for foreign firms operating in China. There is a strong belief by western firms that China has not gone far enough in addressing these concerns. Perhaps in direct response to these criticisms, the EU has unveiled its updated industrial strategy, which prioritizes reducing their dependency on China in strategic areas and investing in localizing supply chains.

The resolution of these contentious issues will be essential in order to create a more conducive environment for global collaboration on climate change. The private sector in turn requires an enabling environment for it to play a constructive role in this dialogue.

Conclusion

The world is on the cusp of a new transition. A sustainability and green revolution is underway, empowered by new digital technologies. The upheaval from this transition will affect every sector of the economy, opening up new opportunities for private business in the process. The expanding scope of markets and the growing role of private firms in China have been a major source of economic growth in the reform era. The private sector in China now has a historic opportunity to lead in the journey to a low carbon future. The stage is set for the private sector to play this role by pushing the boundaries of new technologies.

Mr. Leslie Maasdorp is vice President and CFO of the New Development Bank (NDB)

Exploring the Fabric of Trade: Refashioning the US-China Trade Relationship in a Post-COVID World

Threads of Chinese culture have been woven into the fabric of America since its days as British colonies. Even as the United States became independent from Britain, its business leaders worked to create their own relationships with China that thrived for many years. That relationship eventually deteriorated, only to come back stronger than ever with the formal re-establishment of trade in 1979.

We have relied on the fact that our nations’ fortunes are intertwined since the doors of trade opened once again. For the last several decades, neither country could imagine an economic future without the other. We could see this camaraderie in the long-term plans created between the United States and China, in which processes were interwoven from the idea to the final goods.

The strength of that interdependency was tested with the arrival of the COVID-19 virus. We learned new lessons about our priorities when facing a global crisis, which must be reflected in our trade policies moving forward. The strain placed on global trade by the pandemic highlighted problems in international economic and security reliance applications. Once both countries set out to do what was best for them, thus disrupting the process, the weaknesses in that trading fabric became clear.

Understanding the current economic tapestry

In general, global trade has the goal of lifting the economic fortunes of all countries involved and enhancing global stability by linking economies. The theory is that free trade must be governed by basic rules of fair trade which means countries are held accountable for breaking trade rules.

Since the US-China trade breakthrough in the 1970s, the relationship between the United States and China has grown in size and strength every year as our economies have become more and more integrated. However, relations have soured and changed dramatically over the past four years.   

This disruption in the relationship due to political suspicions, inflexibility, and unfair trade practices led to the adoption of steady increases in tariffs, counter-tariffs and other protectionist actions. Such actions increased tension across all dimensions of the bilateral relationship, markedly deteriorating trade and investment relations, despite the recent “Phase One Tariff Agreement” which was meant to de-escalate the tensions.

By 2019, both countries were beginning to mend their relationship. China was starting to make structural reforms in accordance with the agreement, while the United States was preparing for implementation in what would have been a conciliatory period. Then COVID-19 began wreaking havoc on public health and the global economy.

This fast-spreading pathogen reignited discord in the US- China trade relationship and began to unravel the progress being made. Subsequently, lines between the commercial and national security domains became significantly more blurred, bringing increased uncertainty and distrust into the relationship.

Unravelling the status quo

Businesses in both countries must become more active advocates in re-establishing these critical ties to counter the anti-US-China trade supporters who benefit from discord between our two nations. These alarmists in both countries do their best to “monetize negativity,” especially in the media. They suggest that any form of trade or business

cooperation between the two countries is disloyal or even traitorous. Such intransigence will lead to greater isolation which will, in turn, stunt economic growth, international development, intellectual progress and cultural exchanges.   

One such example is the growing push for mandatory “decoupling” of the US and China. The basic concept of decoupling is to make both nations independent, while still working closely together. The issue then becomes, how exactly – and to what degree – our nations would decouple.

On the positive side, decoupling could open the door for stronger trade relationships with other nations on politically sensitive products, such as computer microchips. This would reduce dependency on each other by being able to supply critical national needs in case of emergencies by identifying alternatives if the primary network fails, rather than depending on a single power source.

On the negative side, decoupling has also been used as the rationale for the United States to abandon cooperation with China, particularly in cooperative science development research in the university sector as well as many academic, cultural, and economic arenas.

Finding a balance between accepting desirable investment by Chinese interests in US business while also appropriately screening Chinese acquisitions to ensure that there is no strategic threat to US national interests is a continuous dilemma for business in the United States. Protection of the US’s national security is becoming more restrictively interpreted as evidenced by the expansion of powers of the US Government body CFIUS, which evaluates all foreign business investment. Chinese businesses are similarly restricting US investment in areas they consider to be of strategic value.

Determining the extent and method for decoupling and finding a creative way to refashion the relationship will likely fall on the shoulders of business leaders who have a vested interest in a stable, bi-lateral relationship, which is unencumbered by the political posturing of government leaders.

Mending the relationship

As policymakers can also get lost in larger, overarching issues of trade, business leaders have a crucial part to play. They must direct policymakers to focus and engage in serious talks that reconcile the relationship between the trading partners.

The following are some key elements for an impactful reset in the face of a world recovering from the inextricable impacts on our health and our economies by COVID-19.

Short-term solutions: Immediate actions that are doable now

Reduce tariffs. Current tariff rates are approximately 20 percent on critical items from both countries. If no action were taken by either side, these levels could potentially become normal and permanent. This will distort the US- China trade relationship forever by reducing employment, impoverishing citizens, and handicapping business on both sides. Steps should be taken immediately to cut these rates, which are negatively affecting both countries.

Complete and implement Phase One and begin Phase Two of the US-China trade agreement. The Chinese have stated publicly that they will continue to implement and finalize the Phase One agreement. So far, Phase One increased exports in early 2021, with a particularly positive trend in most agriculture and some manufacturing categories. Completion of Phase One will be a difficult undertaking since the remaining issues relate to technology, cyber security, industrial policy, and China’s State-owned enterprises. The United States should monitor and enforce Chinese commitment according to the timing which was publicly stated and agreed upon by both nations.

Begin momentum on agreement of Phase Two prior to the completion of Phase One. Due to the challenging issues in Phase One, Phase Two could be lost to the cutting room floor if we waited until Phase One is complete to implement it. Business leaders in both nations should work with policymakers to simultaneously begin Phase Two. This will show both nations the benefits of continuing to open trade relations. A date should be set to conclude Phase One, perhaps coinciding with an already occurring event, such as the APAC meeting in October 2021, so that travel and meetings can be optimized for both the United States and China. They could become role models for the reopening of the global economy in the post-COVID world by agreeing to meet and begin incremental progress built on Phase One. 

Withdraw travel restrictions. Travel and tourism between our nations is a critical industry – 30 billion $ annually – as well as a serious cultural exchange program for both countries. the US and China should immediately agree to remove many of the current visa restrictions, such as the American restrictions on Chinese Communist Party (CCP) members. Similarly, the Chinese should remove travel restrictions on American government leaders, businesspeople, and other US citizens.

Remove academic restrictions. The academic exchange between our two nations is a 15 billion $ industry. Looking beyond the mere economic impact, there is an immeasurable intellectual benefit. While both nations are wary of sharing military research, and the United States is concerned about a misuse of Chinese academics, these issues should not condemn the entire category. Business leaders must take the lead in working with policymakers in both countries to discuss how to assure and implement stricter guidelines preserving academic freedom and expanding Chinese academic research, while tightening up appropriate security policies where necessary.

Relax overly constraining investment restrictions. Cross-border investment between the United States and China is an effective tool for correcting any trade imbalances. Therefore, we should be encouraging the investment in each other’s capital accounts to keep the relationship in check. More Chinese investment inside US borders also could lead to improved employment numbers. Therefore, both countries should remove over-restrictive regulatory regimes, which are counterproductive in regulating investments in each country. For example, the United States would benefit

greatly from a strategic examination of programs, such as the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS) program and its expansive powers, implementation and decision-making authority. Concurrently, the Chinese side should make sincere efforts to limit those areas of investment that are closed to foreigners.

Long-term solutions: More complex actions, potentially requiring a major policy overhaul

Engage in strategic CPTTP discussions. Dialogue between the United States and China about the joining the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTTP) would significantly improve the long-term prognosis for US-China trade. Chinese leadership indicated that it is interested in joining and American leaders are studying this decision, but have made no final commitment. Unfortunately, the United States runs the risk of being locked out of Asia if it does not join the CPTTP. This would seriously damage the United States’ ability for collaboration with China in this critical world market. A strategic dialogue between both countries’ leaders could also be a great blueprint for a subsequent technology dialogue, and many other further discussions at the World Trade Organization (WTO).

Develop global technology innovation rules. Coming together on a global technology innovation strategy is the most complex and demanding concern both nations face if there is any chance of real collaboration. Critical questions must be addressed regarding the role of technology in the global economy, which will allow us all to benefit and avoid being threatened. A strategic, high-level dialogue between the United States, China, and the European Union should be convened soon to focus on the rules for cooperation on technology, the rules for the competition on technology, and how to enforce those rules.

Redirect energy to a focus on business. Trade is key for business development and economic security. Collaboration is essential in this time of difficulties with our global 

economy. Trade and business – not politics – will help lead us out of our current economic turmoil and back to a more stable relationship. 

Weaving a new business fabric

As I have laid out here, our nations’ intertwining layers of business make our economies stronger. We have learned that the United States and China could survive apart, but mere survival is not the goal. The goal is to create economies that are the strongest possible for our respective citizenry so that we can take on any challenge.

Neither the United States nor China can fault the other for wanting the best for their own countries and placing the needs of others secondary to their own. Understanding exactly what that means – and being strategic about planning for future crises – is an important aspect of our future business relationship.

The pandemic has taught us that some localized decoupling of our national political and security goals from our business goals may be necessary in the short-term to realign our priorities moving forward.

However, the data is clear: full, long-term decoupling of the US and Chinese economies would weaken both of our nations and have global ramifications that could unravel the economies of our smaller neighbors and partners. The commercial and economic leaders of both countries must take steps to positively influence this critical relationship in these crucial times.

COVID-19 showed us where our economies were weak. Once we address these logistical bottlenecks, domestic policy flaws, and stockpile insufficiencies together, we will be stronger, more resilient, and prepared for future crises.

Ms. Joan McEntee served in a number of senior international trade positions at the US Department of Commerce. In the George H. Bush administration, she has been Acting Undersecretary for International Trade.

China and the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP)

Introduction

The signing of the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership agreement (RCEP) on 15 November 2020 was a culmination of East Asian economic diplomacy. In a major success for the ASEAN countries, after ten years of negotiations they have created the world’s largest trading bloc. The fifteen RCEP signatories include the ten ASEAN Member States, the three major Northeast Asian economies (China, Japan, Korea), and the two advanced Oceanian economies of Australia and New Zealand. India withdrew from the agreement one year before finalization out of concern about cheap imports from China but retains a special status that allows it to rejoin at short notice. RCEP will come into force once six ASEAN members and four of the non-ASEAN “dialogue partners” have ratified the agreement. Thailand, Singapore, Japan, and China have ratified by mid-2021, and RCEP is on track to enter into force in early 2022.

RCEP abounds in superlatives. The ten ASEAN members (Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and Vietnam), and their five dialogue partners (Australia, China, Japan, New Zealand, and South Korea) account for 30 percent of the global population, 29 percent of global GDP and 28 percent of global trade1. This puts RCEP ahead of the tripartite United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA), with 6.5 percent of global population, 26 percent of global GDP, and 16 percent of global trade; and the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP) with 6.5 percent of global population, 15 percent of global GDP, and 15 percent of global trade2.

Japan and Korea will be the major and immediate beneficiaries of the free trade agreement, as RCEP will connect them in a free trade group with China for the first time. Trade benefits for the ASEAN countries will be minimal and only come into effect in the long term. Instead, ASEAN countries expect harmonised trading rules to boost their regional production networks and supply chain integration with China through trade and investment. China will draw tangible and intangible benefits from RCEP. These include trade gains, mainly with Japan and Korea, access to resources and markets, and closer integration of its global value chains with the Asian region. The main intangible benefit for China is its diplomatic integration in the region. China’s cooperation with ASEAN strengthens its reputation as a proponent of multilateralism and adds to its credentials as a rule-maker for the regional rules- based economic order.

RCEP has enhanced the global diplomatic standing of its signatories. The successful conclusion of RCEP has elevated the inclusive and accommodative style of ASEAN and East Asian economic diplomacy to the global arena. RCEP has affirmed the collective ability of its members to shape legal trade norms at the multilateral level as an alternative to US and European agreements3. An Australian observer noted, “After the World Trade Organisation, RCEP will arguably be the most important agreement in the global trade system. The rules and standards it develops will set important precedents for how governments manage their trade relations in the 21st century”4.

This is relevant for the future expansion and upgrading of RCEP and its interaction with the CPTPP, the successor agreement of the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) from which the United States withdrew under the Trump administration. China was originally excluded from TPP but join its successor, given that seven RCEP members are among the eleven CPTPP members. Five days after signing the RCEP agreement, China’s President Xi Jinping declared that China was actively considering joining CPTPP. As the global competition between US and China led supply chain intensifies, there is speculation that the United States might consider re-joining CPTPP.

RCEP is economically more significant than the CPTPP and will redirect trade and economic links toward East Asia. RCEP and CPTPP combined could more than offset the global losses from the US-China trade war, if not the individual losses of China and the United States5.

The RCEP agreement

The objectives of the RCEP agreement formulated in 2012 are to establish “a modern, comprehensive, high-quality and mutually beneficial economic partnership agreement among the ASEAN Member States and ASEAN’s FTA Partners”. The final agreement has 20 chapters covering trade in goods, trade in services, investment, temporary movement of natural persons, rules of origin, customs procedures and trade facilitation, trade remedies, intellectual property, competition, government procurement, and institutional provisions. Four market access annexes list county-specific tariff schedules, commitments for services, measures for services and investment, and schedules of movement of natural persons6.

The RCEP agreement is an evolving framework overseen by the newly established permanent Secretariat. The RCEP agreement has its strengths in traditional trade and investment facilitation and allows transition periods for developing member economies. RCEP does not include behind-the-border restrictions of digital trade and does not address governance issues relating to environmental protection, labour, anti-corruption, transparency, and investor-State dispute settlement.

RCEP’s impact on trade

The frequently quoted simulations by Petri and Plummer (2020) envisage substantial growth in trade spread unevenly across the region. Their simulations indicate that tariff reductions will have a small positive effect on the GDP of the RCEP bloc. Trade will only add 0.4 percent to the aggregate GDP level after the first ten years, rising to 0.5 percent after a further ten years. China will be marginally affected by RCEP trade liberalization, while Japan and Korea will be winners. Australia and New Zealand are expected to realise early gains from tariff reductions on primary products, which will add up to 0.6 percent and 0.5 percent respectively by year 20.

According to the Monetary Authority of Singapore (2020), ASEAN countries with their existing bilateral free trade agreements across the region, as well as with the other RCEP signatories, will experience minimal tariff reductions of 0.7 percent by year 20 of the agreement, which will affect 8.4 percent of all goods exports7. One additional explanation for the slow pace of tariff reduction among ASEAN members is the additional time given to the lower income economies of Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam to adjust their economies.

A different simulation of the impact of trade liberalisation on exports and imports of RCEP members, based on World Bank data, concludes that ASEAN members will experience a deterioration of their export performance and Balance of Trade in favour of the non-ASEAN members8.

Trade performance alone is therefore not the driving motivation of RCEP. Petri and Plummer’s (2020) simulations show that RCEP, as well as CPTPP, matter more for shifts in regional supply chains and regional production networks.

RCEP’s impact on regional production networks

RCEP covers a highly differentiated bloc of countries, with upstream high-tech manufacturers concentrated in Japan and Korea; midstream producers in Thailand and the Philippines; low labour costs in Cambodia, Laos, and Myanmar; all linked to China with its concentrated global value chains. This broad structure of diverse production locations has evolved over time, but received a boost from the trade war and the economic and technological decoupling of the United States from China. In response, East Asian countries have moved closer together by forming regional production networks linked to the region’s advanced manufacturers in industries such as electrical and electronic equipment, machinery, and vehicles9.

RCEP supports this trend through specific trade liberalisation and measures facilitating cross-regional movement of intermediate goods and services. Two core provisions of the RCEP agreement concern rules of origin and cumulation. In standard free trade agreements, rules of origin and cumulation specify the amount of local content required to qualify tariff exemption or reduction when goods move from one partner country to another, for example from Vietnam to Japan or Korea, before ending up in a China-based global value chain. 

RCEP has the globally most liberal rules of origin to harmonise trading rules across the region at a very low threshold of 40 percent for local content. In other words, intermediate goods with up to 60 percent non-RCEP input enjoy tariff reductions among RCEP members. RCEP further plans to introduce a single certificate of origin for use throughout the region and in a second step let qualified producers issue this certificate by self-certification without government involvement.

RCEP combines the regional advantages of a diversified technical, labour, and market environment with a highly flexible institutional framework. On this basis, ASEAN has been able to withstand the global trend of declining foreign direct investment in the past. The RCEP strategy is to rely on the growth of regional production networks, rather than trade flows alone, to improve local economies and reduce inequality among Member States. The expectation is that RCEP rules will not only incentivise Member Countries such as China to invest in the region, but also attract FDI from outside the region.

The global impact of RCEP

There are diverging estimates and simulations of the global and regional economic effects of RCEP and its ability to reduce the losses from the US-China trade war. RCEP is projected to raise global national incomes by 186 billion $ annually by 2030, according to Petri and Plummer (2020). Among the members, the main beneficiaries are China, Japan, and South Korea. According to these simulations, China will benefit more from RCEP under a trade war scenario, but overall RCEP will only offset one third of economic losses projected for China under the trade war. 

For Europe, RCEP creates economic opportunities through harmonization of information requirements and local content standards. The rules of origin will make local supply chains more flexible and resilient and encourage movement of supply chains to the region. Advanced manufacturers are most likely to be attracted by the advanced consumer and producer markets and varied production bases in East Asia. European producers are already well represented in the RCEP region, where they have had to deal with a multitude of bilateral agreements in the past10.

RCEP is hailed as a commercial and diplomatic victory for China, but the picture is more complex. RCEP is first of all a triumph for ASEAN diplomacy, demonstrating its ability to create consensus among its varied members, as well as integrate the major regional economies in one regulatory framework. RCEP is limiting China’s ability to interfere with regional partners, as China relies on their support in resisting attempts to decouple its economy from Western economies. The communality of interests among ASEAN, China, Japan, Korea, Australia, and New Zealand, which all have their conflicts of interest, signals the shift of global economic power to Asia. With RCEP, the Asian powers have established themselves as rule-makers and contributors to a rules-based global economic system, short of authority compared to the WTO, but only second in size.

China’s acquiescence to ASEAN diplomacy vindicates China’s own Asian-style economic diplomacy (while not the propagandistic excesses of wolf-warrior diplomacy). Inclusiveness of negotiations and accommodation of economically weaker partners as opposed to aiming for rigorous, Western-style agreements (Petri and Dollar, 2020), will be one aspect of China’s role in shaping transnational trade and economic governance. In the words of Petri:

I suspect the point is that the rules for the 21st century will not be written either by the United States or by China or by Asia，

but they will have to somehow triangulate the differences among these two types of economies and visions of the future trading system. I don’t think we fully appreciate this yet. These rules will have to be, if they are to bridge both Asia and the United States, they will have to be different from the ones that we have so far developed”11.

Hans Hendrischke is professor of Chinese Business and Management at the University of Sydney Business School.

1 “Short Overview of the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) – Think Tank”, accessed 13 June 2021, https://www.europarl.europa.eu/thinktank/en/document.html?reference=EXPO_BRI(2021)653625.

2 Ibidem.

3 “The RCEP – Great Power Competition and Cooperation over Trade | Afronomics law”, accessed 13 June 2021, https://www.afronomicslaw.org/category/analysis/rcep-great-power-competition-and-co-operation-over-trade. 

4 “What’s the Deal about Rules-of-Origin in the RCEP Negotiations?”, PerthUSAsia, accessed 13 June 2021, https://perthusasia.edu.au/blog/what’s-the-deal-about-rules-of-origin-in-the-rcep.

5 P.A. Petri and M.G. Plummer, “Working Paper 20-9 East Asia Decouples from the United States: Trade War, COVID-19, and East Asia’s New Trade Blocs”, 2020.

6 “LEGAL TEXT”, RCEP, n.d., accessed 29 June 2021, https://rcepsec.org/legal-text/.

7 Monetary Authority of Singapore, “RCEP’s Impact on Trade and Growth in the Asia Pacific”, Macroeconomic Review, 1, 2020, pp. 25-34.

8 R. Banga, K.P. Gallagher and P. Sharma, “RCEP: Goods Market Access Implications for ASEAN”, (n.d.).

9 P.A. Petri and M.G. Plummer, “Working Paper 20-9 East Asia Decouples from the United States: Trade War, COVID-19, and East Asia’s New Trade Blocs”, cit.

10 “Short Overview of the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) – Think Tank”, cit.

11 P.A. Petri and D. Dollar, “What You Should Know about RCEP, Asia’s New Trade Agreement”, Brookings, 19 November 2020, accessed 13 June 2021, https://www.brookings.edu/podcast-episode/what-you-should-know-about-rcep-asias-new-trade-agreement/.

The third volume of China and the World examines the relationship between China and the world from the angles of culture, ideas, and art.

Click here to get this book

Jacques Chirac and China is a collection of essays about the relationship between the former French President and China.
It will be published in 2022.

Inspiring Tianjin introduces the city of Tianjin.

Click here to get this book

Selected Articles

忆天津

我和天津颇有渊源，这也是我担任《灵感·天津》一书主编并为之撰文的缘由，愿此书为这座独一无二的城市带来更多关注。谨以此文与读者分享：天津这座中国北方城市，不仅是通往某个目的地的途经之处，它本身就是一个独具魅力与特色的目的地。

和许多在法国接受教育的年轻人一样，在1996年夏天我第一次来到中国前就听说过天津这个名字。法国学生，尤其是那些热爱文学和诗歌的人，对保罗·克洛代尔（1868-1955）并不陌生。他们一定记得他与中国之间的深刻联系，也一定想象过他在1906至1909年间作为法国外交官在天津度过的时光。

德日进（1881-1955）是另一位一生都与这座中国北方港口城市有着密切联系的法国著名人士。他曾为天津自然博物馆（原为黄河白河博物馆）的创始人桑志华（1876-1952）提供工作上的支持，为中国古生物学的发展做出了重大贡献。

然而，我个人与天津的渊源还要从黑海之滨的保加利亚说起。2006年，我决定在索非亚举办中欧论坛，我认为这座城市与欧亚大陆连续性方面的议题密切相关。四年前我创立了中欧论坛，旨在进一步增进欧洲与中国之间的相互了解。这一旅程至今仍在继续！

在筹备2006年中欧论坛期间，我有幸见到了时任中国驻保加利亚大使于振起先生。这段美好而难忘的相遇始于对苏东坡（1037-1101）《念奴娇·赤壁怀古》的赏析。当时餐厅的墙上正好挂着这首词的书法作品，于大使同我共赏“大江东去浪淘尽……”， 仿佛置身于“一樽还酹江月”的意境之中。

在摆满佳肴美馔的中式晚宴上，当于振起大使得知我从未去过天津这座对他而言有着重要意义的城市时，他倍感惊讶。他告诉我，一个学习中国历史文化的人，若不知晓南开大学及其学术传统，那将是一个错误。

我将于大使的话深深地记在心里，并从未感到后悔。天津的历史，与溥仪（1906-1967）、袁世凯（1859-1916）、张学良（1901-2001）、梁启超（1873-1929）密不可分，至今仍是展现20世纪中国大变革的佳视窗之一。可以说，人们能够在天津找到中国现代性的不少来源。

2006年11月，我第一次拜访南开大学。我了解到南开1919年建校以来的丰富历史以及它与周恩来（1898-1976）之间的联系，也感受到南开充满活力的学术生活。我还与当时的南开党委书记薛进文先生进行了一次非常愉快且富有成果的对话。

三年后，中华人民共和国建国60周年之际，我有幸与天津市政府合作，举办了一场有多位欧洲领导人出席的高级别会议，包括前法国总理洛朗·法比尤斯和前德国总理格哈德·施罗德。

从天津的建筑风格可见，欧洲与中国早在帝国主义和殖民主义时期就已相遇。对中国而言这无疑是一段悲痛的历史。所幸，如今的中国已稳健地走在复兴的道路上，在世界事务中重拾中心地位。

天津历史上的九个租界中，有七个为欧洲国家所设立：奥匈帝国（1901-1917）、比利时（1902-1931）、英国（1860-1943）、法国（1860-1946）、德国 （1899-1917）、意大利（1901-1947）和俄罗斯（1900-1920），另外两个由美国（1869-1902）和日本（1898-1945）设立。

在今天为众人所熟知的五大道，仍坐落着200多座独具风情特色和历史价值的建筑。“老上海”的故事已然写尽，而天津仍有许多不为人知的生动故事，足以给学术界和读者带来惊喜。

在如此丰富的历史的召唤下，在天津继续推动和深化21世纪中欧对话具有重要意义。2008年北京奥运会期间，许多人重新认识了埃里克·亨利·利迪尔（1902-1945）这位曾在1924年巴黎奥运会上获得的苏格兰运动员，他的一生与天津有着千丝万缕的联系。《天堂的浅滩》作者布莱恩·鲍威尔（1918-2008）也以天津为背景生动地展现了中国与欧洲的交往史。

2011年，在联合国教科文组织前总干事伊琳娜·博科娃女士的积极支持下，我在巴黎展开了中欧论坛的筹备工作。我非常高兴地看到南开大学深度参与到了这个在联合国机构下进行的文明间对话。

在2011年6月27日的论坛开幕式上，我提到了南开大学创始人张伯苓（1876-1951）的弟弟张彭春（1892-1957）：“中国传统的世俗主义和人文主义在历史上启发过西方。曾任联合国人权委员会副主席的中国外交家、学者张彭春在1948年《世界人权宣言》的起草工作中发挥了关键作用。他在埃莉诺·罗斯福主持的辩论会上说：‘18世纪，当进步的人权思想在欧洲发轫时，中国哲学的译本激励了伏尔泰、魁奈、狄德罗等思想家的人文主义反封建思潮。’”

经过连续九年与天津的建设性交流，多项与欧洲的合作项目开花结果。2015年，我很荣幸被天津市政府授予“海河友谊奖”，这对我而言弥足珍贵。2019年，我受邀出席南开大学百年校庆纪念大会。看到一座城市在展望未来的同时追忆过去，我十分感动。

14年来，我亲眼见证了天津发展成为一个21世纪智慧城市，国际知名度不断提升。自2007年以来，世界经济论坛新领军者年会每年在天津和大连交替举行。2017年，世界智能大会在天津拉开帷幕，这是一个将科技与可持续发展相结合的国际平台。正如我在2019年7月向《中国日报》表示的那样，“天津正在成为一个真正的智慧城市，速度超乎人们的想象。”

然而，在《灵感·天津》这本书的框架下，我想描述的是天津在个人层面打动我的特征。换言之，我想用文字描绘一幅天津的心理画像，并希望以此引发更多有关“城市性格”的讨论。

巴黎、纽约、马德里、东京、伦敦和柏林各有各的特征，而我认为北京、上海、深圳、成都、杭州和天津也正是如此。

只有懒惰肤浅的人才会认为中国的大城市都如出一辙。事实上，正是中国的内部多样性赋予了这个“中心国家”无尽的魅力。

要走近天津的灵魂，关键在于要懂得欣赏它的低调感。天津不会宣称自己是一个经济或文化中心，因为在天津看来假装领先他人就是过为己甚。这种低调的文化会带来几方面的影响，其中之一就是天津从不会让你失望。相反，它真正的价值被一种随着时间推移而逐渐被人理解的谦逊所掩盖，促使你不断探索它的多个面貌。

作为中国四大直辖市（即北京、天津、上海、重庆）之一以及拥有超过1500万人口的重要交通枢纽，天津毗邻北京，并与朝鲜半岛和日本隔海相望，是一个真正的国际化大都市。天津港作为世界上第四大港口（按吞吐量计算），与180个国家和地区有着贸易往来。

然而，天津并不急于展现它的优势，也不渴望成为焦点。天津的质朴和简单对许多人而言都极具吸引力，我也不例外。

天津的直率、低调、毫不做作还造就了其独一无二的津式幽默。说起中国相声界的代表人物，比如马三立（1914-2003）、侯宝林（1917-1993）、郭德纲，人们自然会将相声与天津联系在一起。而津式幽默也为天津的都市生活增添了不少诗情画意。

若要寻觅天津独有的特色，首先跃入脑海的是丰富多彩的天津方言、杨柳青年画、泥人张彩塑和风筝魏。天津美食也是天津生活方式的重要组成部分。值得一提的是，第一本关于中华料理的法语书正是由亨利·勒库尔1925年在天津创作的！

开放是天津的另一大重要特征。在这座“桥城”，有名的桥莫过于当年的万国桥，也就是今天的解放桥。远道而来的外地中国游客和国外友人都能真切地感受到天津人与身俱来的热情好客。

天津市总面积11,946平方公里（几乎是上海的两倍），可谓幅员辽阔。然而，人们不该因此忽视了天津另一个令人着迷的特点。在海河附近，也就是历史上的市中心，城市生活充满了浓浓的人情味儿。在天津，道路和桥梁的设计也考虑到了行人与这座城市之间更深层次的情感联系，而不是为了走马观花。

漫步在缓缓流淌的海河河畔，不难理解为什么将天津称为“桥城”。当你继续在这座城市漫步和思考时，你会很快领悟到，整个城市就是一座连通情谊的桥梁，使得文化与文化互相融通，过去与未来交相辉映。

即使你已离去甚久，它那一声声热情的回响仿佛仍在不停地召唤着访客归来，或真实或虚幻地回荡在无尽的回忆之中。

高大伟：汉学家、中欧论坛创始人（2002年）

天津：两个国家，同心相连

意大利与中国深厚的历史渊源，可以追溯到威尼斯商人马可波罗（Marco Polo）、传教士利玛窦（Matteo Ricci），以及马国贤（Matteo Lipa），而这只是知名的一些例子。当我们谈论两国间的商务和文化交流时，总是不能绕开丝绸之路。那条延绵不绝的走廊，始于“永远安宁之城”长安，终于传奇的“永恒之城”罗马。在我们谈到中意友谊时，也不能不谈到丝绸、香料和许多其他商品，正是这些商品成就了丝绸之路，并使之誉满全球的传奇。

丝绸看起来是连结中意友谊的主线。如果我们想在想象的时间线里更靠近我们的时代，统一后的意大利与中华帝国之间的官方联系始于1866年。当年，护卫舰队长阿尔曼容（Vittorio F. Arminjon）奉命出使中国和日本。此行的首要目的是巩固意大利商业企业的实力，首先就是丝绸产业，丝绸之路的名字正是源自丝绸产业。

在国际贸易关系中，天津一直作为中国北方经济重镇。其原因有三：首先，天津发挥着商务和军事港口的战略功能，这个功能一直到沿用至今。这个城市得以迅速发展的另一个原因就是它毗邻首都，尤其在英国人在1897年开通了通往北京的第一条铁路之后。后要归功于穿过城市中心的北段京杭大运河：这条运河建于隋朝，甚至数次被马可波罗提及。马可波罗曾来到过天津，还称其为“天堂般的城市”。京杭大运河从过去到现在一直都是世界上长的全程可航行的人工运河，它在天津港到全国各地、尤其是首都北京的商品运输上发挥了重要作用，北京离海较远，有160公里所以，天津在以“航海家之国”而闻名的意大利眼中享有格外重要的地位。

在二十世纪早期，天津知名度甚高，我们可以在许多意大利军人、商人、和旅行家的文字里找到对天津的描绘和赞美。在几年前，出于个人兴趣，我决定更深地挖掘那些曾居住过天津的意大利人的故事。我发现了本韦努蒂（Giuseppe Messerotti Benvenuti）的书信，他是一位受命来北京开意大利医院的军医以及中尉，和我一样在摩德纳省出生。那么这位百年前曾经到访过天津的中尉，是如何看待天津，这个我居住了许多年的城市呢？其实，他在真正到达天津前就很了解这里了：“天津比北京大多了，也漂亮多了：北京只有不到五十万居民，而天津已经超过九十万了。”在旅程开始前，中尉就已经对中国国家、人民和历史文化都有所了解，但是在天津和北京度过的一年，还是毫无疑问的帮助了他更深入地发现中国的美丽和宏伟。他曾在多个场合多次重复说，意大利人可以向中国人学习的地方有很多。

几个世纪来，究竟有多少意大利人感受到了中尉所描述的对天津的尊重与爱？不计其数。而且这种类深远的影响绝对不是巧合：一直以来，天津一直是中意友谊的中心。这一友谊的核心原因可以在天津的前意大利租界区找到。

天津的意租界在建于1902年，曾被当地人称为“贵族租界”，森佐·菲莱蒂（Vincenzo Fileti）及其继任者（1902-1920的管理者）为此做出巨大的努力。意租界以其庄严有致的别墅和青翠秀美的花园闻名，在20世纪20年代到40年代，曾经是中意友好关系“强劲的心脏”，也成为了许多中国知识分子和名人喜爱的居住地。许多建筑显示了二十世纪初期的典型意大利建筑风格。感谢中国政府的帮助，如今我们还能欣赏这些精妙绝伦的建筑。

前意租界，现在被重新命名为“意大利风情区”，中国政府和意大利Sirena组织2004年开始的重建工作，恢复了其往日的荣光。这一中意合作项目涉及对目前八十座建筑物中约二十层外墙的翻新，从而为该地区的商业和旅游业提供了新的动力。前意大利总统卡洛·阿泽利奥·钱皮（Carlo Azeglio Ciampi）在2004年十二月份对中国进行了访问，并参观了由北京意大利文化组织的“通往天津的路：中意关系的一千年”展览，为进一步推进两国友好关系起到了至关重要的作用。

有了这一新发动力和两国政府间的紧密合作，风格独特的意大利风情区在中外企业家中备受欢迎。著名导演朱赛贝·托纳多雷（Giuseppe Tornatore）选择在这里来开设一个电影俱乐部，并以他获得奥斯卡佳外语片的作品《天堂电影院》命名。

如今，在这个美丽的街区散步，就仿佛身处意大利，身处托纳多雷电影的情境中。意大利风情区无疑是天津旅游业的一大地标，在今年更是有着尤为突出的重要性：2020年标志着两个中意关系的重要里程碑。这一年，“文化和旅游年”在一月二十三日拉开了帷幕，十一月下旬两国也将共庆意大利共和国和中华人民共和国建立外交关系五十周年。

在这一新冠疫情肆虐的特殊年份，在漫长的隔离期中，每一个住在天津的意大利人都对意大利风情区魂牵梦萦。当防疫响应级别降低，我们终于可以来到意大利风情区，细细品味它的色彩、风格和气味，仿佛瞬间回到了我们心爱的故土。每每念及故乡，我就会像许多其它居住天津的意大利人一会去往意大利风情区。这一城市地标深受所有游客和当地居民的喜爱，无论他们是，中国人、意大利人、或是其他国家的人。品尝完美的披萨，享受在露天桌台上的一杯咖啡，或是静静欣赏美丽的建筑， 这里都是一个理想的地方。这一块小小的区域凝结着太多美丽，让人难以挑出其中之，但有一个绝对不能错过的地方就是但丁广场（Piazza Dante）。为什么它如此特别呢？第一是因为它的名字：“Piazza”这个词足以唤起每个意大利人心中的美好回忆，再加上对于但丁——我们伟大的国家诗人的尊重，结果是完美的。第二是因为那座伫立于但丁广场中心的带翅膀的胜利女神雕像。雕像属于意风区重建工作的一部分，这座大理石雕塑本身就足以令人惊叹，但还有另一原因让它更加特别，也包含了中意友谊的精髓：保护我们的胜利女神身背象征和平的橄榄树枝——还有什么比和平更美好的愿望呢？

意大利风情区完美承载了超过一千年以来的中意友谊。就像以融合东西方文化而闻名的意大利传教士郎世宁（Giuseppe Castiglione）一样，天津意大利风情区结合了维西利亚风格的建筑设计与生机勃勃的中国文化、塑造了具有包容性、国际性和多元文化特征的完美城市典范。包容、多元文化和文化交流：这些是我们每天都试图向南开大学意大利语系学生传递的核心价值观。南开大学意大利语系也是另一个紧紧连结天津与意大利的元素。我们深知自己身负重要使命，因为我们认为教育能让这个世界变得更好。当我们告诉我们的学生那些中意友谊的美好历史时，我们也鼓励他们正像天津在这一千多年中做的一样，成为两种文化交流的大使。

Tianjin's Resonance(s)

A relatively long personal association with Tianjin explains my contribution to Inspiring Tianjin, a book that I hope will generate more interest for this unique city. May “Tianjin’s resonance(s)” introduce the idea that this northern Chinese city is not a mere stop on the way to a final destination, but that it is a destination in itself that should be appreciated for its own outstanding features.  

Like many youngsters educated in France, I came across the name of Tianjin well before I visited China for the first time in the summer of 1996. French students, especially those interested in literature and poetry, are familiar with Paul Claudel (1868-1955) and, therefore, they would remember his close links with China and would have tried to imagine the years he spent in Tianjin – or Tientsin as it was then known– between 1906 and 1909 as a French diplomat.

Pierre Teilhard de Chardin (1881-1955) is another prominent French personality forever associated with China’s northern port. He supported the work of Emile Licent (1876-1952), the founder of Tianjin’s Natural History Museum, known as the Hoangho Paiho Museum, and made major contributions to Chinese paleontology.

However, my direct personal connection with Tianjin started not far from the Black Sea in Bulgaria. In 2006, I made the decision to organize the Europe-China Forum in Sofia, a place that I consider highly relevant in discussing issues related to Eurasian continuities. I had established the Europe-China Forum four years earlier with the goal of increasing mutual understanding between Europe and China. This journey persists to this day! 

During the preparation for the 2006 international gathering, I had the privilege of meeting Yu Zhenqi, the then Ambassador of the People’s Republic of China in Bulgaria. It was a beautiful and memorable encounter which began with an appreciation of Memories of Red Cliff by Su Dongpo (1037-1101) whose calligraphic reproduction was hanging on the wall of the Ambassador’s dining room: “Large river turns to the east…”, and Ambassador Yu kindly accompanied me up to “the river-reflected moon”.   

Over a dinner featuring exquisite Chinese dishes, Ambassador Yu Zhenqi expressed his surprise when I told him that I had never been to Tianjin, a city which meant a lot to him. He told me that it would be a mistake for someone studying Chinese history and culture not to be acquainted with Nankai University and its scholastic traditions. 

I took the words of the Ambassador very seriously and I don’t regret it. The history of Tianjin, inseparable from Puyi (1906-1967), Yuan Shikai (1859-1916), Zhang Xueliang (1901-2001) or Liang Qichao (1873-1929) remains one of the best introductions to the larger Chinese transformations of the 20th century. It can be argued that it is in Tianjin that one can find some of the sources of Chinese modernity. 

It was in November 2006 that I managed to visit Nankai University for the first time. I discovered its rich history since its founding in 1919, its connection with Zhou Enlai (1898-1976), and its vibrant intellectual life. I had a most agreeable and fruitful conversation with its then chancellor Xue Jinwen. 

Three years later, for the celebration of the 60th anniversary of the founding of the People’s Republic of China, I had the opportunity to cooperate with the Tianjin Municipality for the organization of a high-level gathering bringing top European personalities to Tianjin, among them the former French Prime Minister Laurent Fabius and the former German Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder. 

As the city’s architecture illustrates, Europe and China had met before in Tianjin during the time of imperialism and colonialism. These were profoundly sad circumstances for China. Fortunately, it is presently well on the way to a robust renaissance and it has regained centrality in world affairs.

Of the nine concessions that have marked Tianjin’s history, seven were European: the Austro-Hungarian (1901-1917), the Belgian (1902-1931), the British concession (1860-1943), the French (1860-1946), the German (1899-1917), the Italian (1901-1947) and the Russian (1900-1920). The two other concessions were the American (1869-1902) and the Japanese (1898-1945).  

In what is known today as Wudadao, literally “the five avenues”, there are still over 200 buildings with interesting architectural features and historical value. While almost everything has been said about the “old Shanghai”, Tianjin can still surprise academics and their readers by the richness of its still untold stories.   

At the evocation of such a rich past, the idea that 21st century Sino-European dialogue has to be continued and deepened in Tianjin makes great sense. In 2008, during the Beijing Olympics, many rediscovered Eric Henry Liddell (1902-1945), the Scottish Olympic gold medalist at the 1924 Paris Olympics whose life is intertwined with Tianjin. Brian Power (1918-2008), the author of The Ford of Heaven, is also a stimulating introduction to the interaction between China and Europe whose backdrop is Tianjin. 

In 2011, with the active support of Irina Bokova, the then director-general of the UNESCO, I prepared for the Europe-China Forum in Paris. It was a true delight to observe Nankai University’s deep involvement in this dialogue between civilizations taking place at a United Nations’ organization. 

At the opening of the forum on June 27, 2011, I made a reference to Zhang Pengchun (1892-1957), the younger brother of Zhang Boling (1876-1951), the founder of Nankai University: “China’s traditional secularism and humanism have in the past inspired the West. Diplomat and man of letters Zhang Pengchun, who served as vice-chairman of the United Nations Commission on Human Rights and played a pivotal role in drafting the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, noted during the debates chaired by Eleanor Roosevelt : “In the 18th century, when progressive ideas with respect to human rights had been first put forward in Europe, translations of Chinese philosophers had been known to have inspired such thinkers as Voltaire, Quesnay and Diderot in their humanistic revolt against feudalistic conceptions”.   

Following nine years of uninterrupted constructive exchanges with Tianjin, various cooperation projects with Europe were realized. In 2015, I was honored to receive a friendship award from the municipal government. I truly cherish it. In 2019, I was invited to the ceremony of Nankai’s 100th anniversary. I was deeply moved to see a city simultaneously remembering its past while preparing for the future.

For 14 years, I have directly witnessed Tianjin’s evolution into a 21st century Smart City, gaining in international visibility. Since 2007, the Annual Meeting of the New Champions, an event established by the World Economic Forum, alternates between Tianjin and Dalian. In 2017, Tianjin established the World Intelligence Congress, an international platform at the intersection of technology and sustainability. As I expressed to the newspaper China Daily in July 2019: “Tianjin might become a true Smart City much faster than people think”.

However, in the framework of the book Inspiring Tianjin, I wish to describe the features of Tianjin that impress me the most, especially on a personal level. In other words, I would like to sketch a psychological portrait of a city with the hope that it triggers more conversation around the theme of the character of urban centers. 

Paris, New York, Madrid, Tokyo, London or Berlin have different characters, but I would argue that the same is also true for Beijing, Shanghai, Shenzhen, Chengdu, Hangzhou or Tianjin.

Only an indolent and superficial mind would conclude that most major Chinese cities are uniform in character. However, it is precisely China’s internal diversity which makes the Middle Country infinitely attractive.   

The key in accessing Tianjin’s soul is the appreciation of its sense of understatement. Tianjin would not claim to be an economic or a cultural capital, for it would find it excessive to pretend to be ahead of others. There are several effects of this culture of understatement, but one is certainly that Tianjin does not disappoint you. On the contrary, its true value is concealed by a modesty that dawns on you over time, forcing you to continuously explore its many faces.   

As one of the four Municipalities directly under the central government – along with Beijing, Shanghai and Chongqing – and a major transportation hub having a population of more than 15 million people, it is indeed a cosmopolitan metropolis close to Beijing, but with a gaze towards the Korean peninsula and Japan. Tianjin’s port is the world’s fourth largest (in tonnage) and trades with 180 countries and territories around the world. 

However, Tianjin would not immediately try to display its strengths, and stays away from being a spectacle. Tianjin’s obvious simplicity is highly attractive to many. It is certainly the case for me. 

A corollary of its straightforwardness, its absence of any pretention and its sense of understatement, Tianjin has also developed a singular sense of humor. With its outstanding performers – e.g. Ma Sanli (1914-2003), Hou Baolin (1917-1993) or Guo Degang –, one rightly associates the xiangsheng, or art of cross talk, to Tianjin. But, in everyday life, Tianjin’s humor is also part of a charming urban poetry.

In a quest for Tianjin’s own characteristics, a colorful dialect, Yangliuqing’s paintings, Zhang’s clay figurines, and Wei’s kites, come immediately to mind. Its culinary delights are also an important component of its way of life. It is interesting to note that the very first book in French on Chinese cuisine was written by Henri Lecourt in 1925 in Tianjin! 

Being open to the Other is also a crucial element of Tianjin’s identity. In the City of Bridges– the most famous being the “international bridge” known today as the “Jiefang Bridge”–, Chinese visitors from other provinces or foreigners coming from afar can feel the gentle embrace of spontaneous hospitality. 

Tianjin occupies a large territory of 11,946 square kilometers (almost two times the size of Shanghai),. However, this should not distract from what is another attractive trait of this city. Around the Hai River, in what is considered the historic city center, urbanism is of human scale. In Tianjin, roads and bridges are also made for pedestrians looking for a deeper, emotional connection to the city, rather than a cursory examination. 

Walking along the slow-moving Hai River, one understands easily why Tianjin is known as the City of Bridges. As one continues to wander and reflect within Tianjin, one soon realizes that this entire city is a conduit for fellowship, for cultures to cross-fertilize, and for the past to resonate into the future. 

Its welcoming echoes resonate long after you have left, as if they were beckoning the visitor to return– physically or metaphorically through the paths of remembrance. 

David Gosset, Sinologist, is the founder of the Europe-China Forum (2002). 

Tianjin: two countries, one heart

Relations between Italy and China have a very long history that can be traced back to the Venetian merchant Marco Polo and the missionaries Matteo Ricci and Matteo Ripa, to name just a few of the most famous characters. When we talk about the commercial and cultural exchanges between the two countries, it is impossible not to mention the Silk Road, that endless corridor that began in Chang’an, the ancient “city of perpetual peace,” and ended in Rome, the legendary “eternal city.” It would also be impossible to talk about the friendship between Italy and China without mentioning silk, spices, and all those products that have allowed the Silk Road to become a legend and leave its mark on the whole world.

Silk seems to be the common thread that connects the friendship between Italy and China. If we want to get closer to our era on an imaginary timeline, relations between post-unification Italy and the Chinese empire officially began in 1866, when the frigate captain Vittorio F. Arminjon was asked to sail to China and Japan on a diplomatic mission. The primary purpose of the mission was the fortification of Italian commercial enterprises, starting with the silk industry, the eponymous industry after which the Silk Road was named.

In the context of international trade relations, Tianjin had always played a role of great importance in the economy of northern China for three main reasons, the first being its strategic function as a commercial and military port, a function it has maintained to this day. Another factor that allowed the development of the city is its proximity to the capital, especially after the British opened the first railway to Beijing in 1897. Last but not least is the passage of the northern section of the Grand Canal in the city center: its construction began during the Sui dynasty, and its existence was even mentioned by Marco Polo, who personally visited Tianjin and called it the “heavenly city.” The Grand Canal was, and still is, the longest fully navigable artificial canal in the world. Hence, it played a crucial role in goods transportation from Tianjin’s port to all of China, especially to the capital, located 160 kilometers away from the sea. Therefore, Tianjin is particularly important in the eyes of its Italian partners and friends, as Italy is famous in the collective imagination as a “nation of navigators.”

In the early 1900s, Tianjin was a well-known city, so much so that we can find descriptions and appreciations in the writings of numerous Italian militaries, merchants, and travelers. A few years ago, out of personal interest, I decided to deepen the research on the Italians who have lived in Tianjin. I then discovered the letters of Giuseppe Messerotti Benvenuti, a military physician and lieutenant sent to China to open an Italian hospital in Beijing. Lieutenant Messerotti Benvenuti, born in the province of Modena just like me, had visited Tianjin, the city where I have lived for many years, over a hundred years before me. What could he have thought of this city? Messerotti Benvenuti knew Tianjin well before arriving there: “Tianjin is much larger and more beautiful than Beijing, while the latter does not reach 500,000 inhabitants, Tianjin passes 900,000”[ Battaglia P., Labanca N. (edited by), Giuseppe Messerotti Benvenuti, un italiano nella Cina dei Boxer. Fotografie e lettere (1900-1901), Modena: Associazione Giuseppe Panini archivi modenesi, 2000, letter n. 5.]. At the beginning of his journey, the lieutenant knew little about China, its people, and its culture. Still, the year spent between Tianjin and Beijing was undoubtedly a great help in discovering its beauty and grandeur. On several occasions, he repeated that Italians had a lot to learn from the Chinese.

Over the centuries, how many Italians have felt the feelings of respect and love described by the lieutenant? Countless, and it is certainly no coincidence: over time, Tianjin has been the center of friendship between Italy and China. One of the central reasons for this friendship can be found in Tianjin’s former Italian Concession. 

The Italian Concession, founded in 1902, was locally known as the “aristocratic concession” thanks to the great efforts of Vincenzo Fileti, administrator between 1912 and 1920, and his successors. Famous for its stately villas and verdant gardens, from the 1920s to the 1940s, it was the beating heart of the friendly relations between Italy and China, as well as one of the favorite places of residence for many Chinese intellectuals and famous people. Many buildings showed the typical traits of Italian architecture of the first half of the 20th century. Thanks to the help of the Chinese Government, today, we can still admire these magnificent buildings.

The former Italian Concession, now renamed the “Italian Style Area,” has returned to its former glory thanks to the restructuring process started in 2004 by the Chinese Government and the Italian Sirena group. The Italian-Chinese project dealt with the renovation of about twenty facades of the 80 buildings currently present to give new impetus to the commerce and tourism of this area of the city. The visit to China of the then President of the Italian Republic Carlo Azeglio Ciampi in December 2004 was also essential, as he had the opportunity to visit the exhibition Road to Tianjin: One Thousand years of relations between Italy and China held at the Italian Institute of Culture in Beijing.

Thanks to this new impetus and the close collaboration between the governments of the two countries, the unique Italian Style Area has become a popular place among Chinese and international entrepreneurs. Even the famous director Giuseppe Tornatore chose it as a set to open a film club named after the work that earned him the Oscar for the best foreign-language film: Nuovo Cinema Paradiso.

Today, as we stroll through the streets of this beautiful neighborhood, we feel like we are in Italy, on the set of one of Tornatore’s films. The Italian Style Area is undoubtedly one of the landmarks of Tianjin’s tourism, an element that acquires even more importance this year. 2020 marks two significant milestones for the history of relations between China and Italy. Not only was the Year of Culture and Tourism inaugurated on 23 January, but the two countries are also getting ready to celebrate the 50th anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations between the Italian Republic and the P.R.C. later in November.

In this particular year, tragically marked by the COVID-19 outbreak, during the long quarantine days, each member of the Italian community in Tianjin was thinking about the Italian Style Area. As soon as the security measures were lifted, we could finally set foot in the Italian Style Area to savor its colors, flavors, and scents and return, even if only for a short time, to our beloved Italy. When I miss my hometown, I, like the many other Italians who have decided to make Tianjin their permanent home, go to the Italian Style Area. This famous spot is a place loved by tourists and residents, whether they are Chinese, Italian, or of other nationalities: it is the perfect place to eat a good pizza, savor a cup of coffee on the outdoor tables or admire the beautiful buildings. There are so many beautiful places in this small area that it would be impossible to choose the most beautiful. However, there is one place that you cannot miss: Piazza Dante. Why is this “piazza” so unique? First of all, for its name: the word “piazza” is enough to awaken beautiful memories in the heart of every Italian, and if we add the homage to Dante, our great national poet, the result is perfect. The second reason is what stands out in the center of Piazza Dante: the winged Victory statue, rebuilt during the area’s restoration process. The marble statue is marvelous, but there is an element that makes it even more special and embodies the true essence of the friendship between Italy and China: the goddess who protects us from above carries an olive tree twig, the symbol of peace par excellence. Is there a better wish than peace?

The Italian Style Area perfectly embodies over 1000 years of friendship between China and Italy. Just like the Italian missionary Giuseppe Castiglione is known for merging East and West in his works, Tianjin’s Italian Style Area combines Versilia inspired architecture and design with the vibrant Chinese culture. The result is the perfect example of a city with an inclusive, international, and multicultural profile. Inclusion, multiculturality, and cultural communication: these are the core values we try to teach every day to the students of Nankai University’s Italian Department, another of the elements that connect Tianjin to Italy. We take our mission very seriously as we believe education is the way to build a better world. While we tell our students the fascinating history of friendship between China and Italy, we encourage them to become ambassadors of the two cultures, precisely as Tianjin has done for over a millennium.

Echos de Tianjin

Une relation personnelle relativement ancienne avec Tianjin explique ma contribution à Tianjin en perspective(s), un livre qui, je l'espère, suscitera un intérêt encore plus grand pour cette ville unique. 

Puissent ces « échos de Tianjin »  introduire à l’idée que cette ville du nord de la Chine n’est pas seulement une étape en route vers d’autres lieux, mais que c’est une destination en soi qui doit être appréciée pour ses caractéristiques propres.

Comme beaucoup de ceux qui ont reçu une éducation en France, j’ai vu mentionné le nom de Tianjin bien avant de visiter la Chine pour la première fois à l'été 1996. Les étudiants français, en particulier ceux qui s'intéressent à la littérature et à la poésie, connaissent Paul Claudel (1868-1955) et, par conséquent, ils se souviennent de ses liens étroits avec la Chine et ont imaginé les années qu'il a passées à Tianjin - ou Tientsin comme on l'appelait alors - entre 1906 et 1909 en tant que diplomate.

Pierre Teilhard de Chardin (1881-1955) est une autre personnalité française de premier plan associée à jamais au port du nord de la Chine. Il a soutenu les travaux d’Emile Licent (1876-1952), le fondateur du Musée d’histoire naturelle de Tianjin, connu sous le nom de Musée Hoangho Paiho, et a par la suite joué un rôle majeur dans le développement de la paléontologie chinoise.

Cependant, c’est non loin de la mer Noire, en Bulgarie, que ma relation personnelle directe avec Tianjin prend sa source. En 2006, j'ai pris la décision d'organiser le Forum Europe-Chine à Sofia, un lieu que je considère très pertinent pour discuter des questions liées aux continuités eurasiatiques. J'avais créé le Forum Europe-Chine quatre ans plus tôt dans le but de contribuer à une meilleure compréhension mutuelle entre l'Europe et la Chine. Ce travail s’est poursuivi jusqu’ à ce jour!

Lors de la préparation de l’évènement international de 2006, j’ai eu le privilège de rencontrer Yu Zhenqi, alors ambassadeur de la République populaire de Chine en Bulgarie. Ce fut une belle et mémorable rencontre qui débuta par une appréciation de Sur la Falaise Rouge pour évoquer le passé de Su Dongbo (1037-1101) dont la reproduction calligraphiée était accrochée au mur de la salle à manger de l'ambassadeur: «Le grand fleuve vers l'Est s’en va…», et l'ambassadeur Yu m’accompagna généreusement jusqu'à «la lune reflétée par le fleuve».

Lors d'un dîner composé d’exquis plats chinois, l'ambassadeur Yu Zhenqi exprima sa surprise lorsque je lui dis que je n'étais jamais allé à Tianjin, une ville qui comptait beaucoup pour lui. Il m'a dit que ce serait une erreur alors que l’on aspire à l’étude de l'histoire et la culture chinoise de ne pas connaître l'Université de Nankai et sa tradition de recherches académiques.

J'ai pris le conseil de l'ambassadeur très au sérieux et je ne le regrette pas. L’histoire de Tianjin, indissociable de Puyi (1906-1967), Yuan Shikai (1859-1916), Zhang Xueliang (1901-2001) ou Liang Qichao ( 1873-1929) reste l'une des meilleures introductions aux grandes transformations chinoises du 20e siècle. On peut affirmer que c'est à Tianjin que l'on trouve certaines des sources de la modernité chinoise.

C'est en novembre 2006 que j'ai pu visiter l'Université de Nankai pour la première fois. J'ai découvert sa riche histoire depuis sa fondation en 1919, son lien avec Zhou Enlai (1898-1976) et le dynamisme de sa vie intellectuelle. Je me souviens d’une conversation des plus agréables et fructueuses avec son chancelier d'alors, le professeur Xue Jinwen.

Trois ans plus tard, à l'occasion de la célébration du 60e anniversaire de la fondation de la République populaire de Chine, j'ai eu l'occasion de coopérer avec la municipalité de Tianjin pour l'organisation d'un rassemblement de haut niveau réunissant à Tianjin des personnalités européennes de premier plan, tels l'ancien Premier ministre français Laurent Fabius et l'ancien chancelier allemand Gerhard Schroeder.

Comme l’illustre l’architecture de la ville, l’Europe et la Chine se sont déjà rencontrées à Tianjin à l’époque de l’impérialisme et du colonialisme. Ce furent des circonstances profondément tristes pour la Chine. Heureusement, elle est depuis en route vers sa renaissance et elle a retrouvé une place centrale dans les affaires mondiales.

Sur les neuf concessions qui ont marqué l'histoire de Tianjin, sept étaient européennes: l'austro-hongroise (1901-1917), la belge (1902-1931), la concession britannique (1860-1943), la française (1860-1946), l’allemande (1899-1917), l’italienne (1901-1947) et la russe (1900-1920). Les deux autres concessions furent américaines (1869-1902) et japonaises (1898-1945).

Dans ce qui est connu aujourd'hui sous le nom de «Wudadao», littéralement «les cinq avenues», il y a encore plus de 200 bâtiments aux caractéristiques architecturales variées et dont la valeur historique est incontestable. Alors que presque tout a été dit sur le «vieux Shanghai», Tianjin peut encore surprendre les universitaires et leurs lecteurs par la richesse de ses histoires passées qui restent encore à présenter.

À l'évocation d'un passé aussi riche, l'idée que le dialogue sino-européen du 21e siècle doit être poursuivi et approfondi à Tianjin prend tout son sens. En 2008, lors des jeux olympiques de Pékin, beaucoup ont redecouvert Eric Henry Liddell (1902-1945), médaillé d'or écossais aux jeux de 1924 dont la vie est intimement liée à Tianjin. Brian Power (1918-2008), l'auteur de The Ford of Heaven – Le gué céleste–, est également une introduction stimulante à l'interaction entre la Chine et l'Europe dont la toile de fond est Tianjin.

En 2011, avec le soutien actif d'Irina Bokova, alors directrice générale de l'UNESCO, c’est à Paris que j'ai organisé le Forum Europe-Chine. Ce fut une grande staisfaction que d’observer la profonde implication de l’Université de Nankai dans ce dialogue entre les civilisations qui se tenait au sein d’une organisation des Nations Unies.

Lors de l'ouverture du forum le 27 juin 2011, j'ai fait référence à Zhang Pengchun (1892-1957), le frère cadet de Zhang Boling (1876-1951), fondateur de l'Université de Nankai: «La laïcité et l'humanisme traditionnels de la Chine ont, dans le passé, inspiré l'Occident. Zhang Pengchun, diplomate et homme de lettres, qui a été vice-président de la Commission des droits de l'homme des Nations Unies et a joué un rôle central dans la rédaction de la Déclaration universelle des droits de l'homme de 1948, a noté lors des débats présidés par Eleanor Roosevelt: «Au 18e siècle, lorsque des idées progressistes en matière de droits de l'homme ont été avancées pour la première fois en Europe, les traductions de philosophes chinois étaient connues pour avoir inspiré des penseurs tels que Voltaire, Quesnay et Diderot dans leur révolte humaniste contre les conceptions féodales ».

Après neuf ans d'échanges constructifs ininterrompus avec Tianjin, divers projets de coopération avec l'Europe ont été réalisés. En 2015, j'ai eu l'honneur de recevoir une distinction du gouvernement municipal. Je chéris ce témoignage d’amitié. En 2019, j'ai été invité à la cérémonie du 100e anniversaire de Nankai. J'ai été profondément ému de voir une ville se souvenir de son passé tout en se préparant pour l'avenir.

Depuis 14 ans, j’ai vu de manière directe Tianjin évoluer vers une ville intelligente du 21e siècle alors qu’elle gagnait en visibilité internationale. Depuis 2007, la réunion annuelle des nouveaux champions, un événement créé par le Forum économique mondial, se tient en alternance entre Tianjin et Dalian. En 2017, Tianjin a créé le «World Intelligence Congress», une plateforme internationale à l'intersection de la technologie et de la durabilité. Comme je l'ai dit au journal China Daily en juillet 2019: «Tianjin pourrait devenir une véritable ville intelligente beaucoup plus rapidement que les gens ne le pensent».

Cependant, dans le cadre du livre Tianjin en perspective(s), je souhaite décrire les caractéristiques de Tianjin qui me laissent, sur le plan personnel, une forte impression. En d'autres termes, je voudrais esquisser un portrait psychologique d'une ville dans l'espoir qu'il déclenche des conversations autour du thème du caractère des centres urbains.

Paris, New York, Madrid, Tokyo, Londres ou Berlin ont des personnalités différentes, mais je dirais qu'il en va de même pour Pékin, Shanghai, Shenzhen, Chengdu, Hangzhou ou Tianjin.

Seul un esprit indolent et superficiel conclurait que la plupart des grandes villes chinoises ont un caractère uniforme. C'est précisément la diversité interne de la Chine qui rend le pays du milieu infiniment attrayant.

La clé pour accéder à l'âme de Tianjin est l'appréciation de son sens de la retenue. Tianjin ne prétend pas être une capitale économique ou culturelle, car il lui paraîtrait excessif de se placer en avant des autres. Il y a plusieurs effets de cette culture de la réserve, mais l'un est certainement que Tianjin ne vous déçoit jamais. Au contraire, sa vraie valeur est cachée par une modestie qui vous apparaît au fil du temps et qui vous invite à continuer à explorer ses nombreux visages.

L'une des quatre municipalités relevant directement du gouvernement central - avec Pékin, Shanghai et Chongqing -, plaque tournante des transports avec une population de plus de 15 millions d'habitants, c'est, dans les faits, une métropole cosmopolite proche de Pékin, mais tournée aussi vers la péninsule coréenne et le Japon. Le port de Tianjin est le quatrième au monde (en tonnage) et commerce avec 180 pays et territoires à travers le monde.

Cependant, Tianjin ne montre pas immédiatement ses forces et avantages et ne veut pas se donner en spectacle. L’évidente sobriété de Tianjin est, pour beaucoup, très attachante, elle l’est certainement pour moi.

Corollaire de sa simplicité, de son absence de prétention et de son esprit de retenue, Tianjin a également développé un humour singulier. Avec ses artistes exceptionnels - Ma Sanli (1914-2003), Hou Baolin (1917-1993) ou Guo Degang -, on associe à juste titre l’art de la scène dit xiangsheng, ou diaphonie, à Tianjin. Mais, au quotidien, l’humour de Tianjin fait également partie d’une charmante poésie urbaine.

Dans une quête des caractéristiques de Tianjin, un dialecte coloré, les peintures de Yangliuqing, les figurines d'argile de Zhang et les cerfs-volants de Wei viennent immédiatement à l'esprit. Ses délices culinaires sont également une composante importante de son mode de vie. Il est intéressant de noter que le tout premier livre en français sur la cuisine chinoise a été écrit par Henri Lecourt en 1925 à Tianjin!

L’ouverture à l’autre est également un élément crucial de l’identité de Tianjin. Dans la ville des ponts – le plus célèbre étant le «pont international» connu aujourd'hui sous le nom de «pont Jiefang» - , les visiteurs chinois d'autres provinces ou les étrangers venant de beaucoup plus loin peuvent ressentir la douce étreinte d’une hospitalité spontanée.

Avec ses 11 946 kilomètres carrés (près de deux fois la taille de Shanghai), Tianjin occupe un vaste territoire. Cependant, cela ne doit pas détourner l'attention de ce qui est un autre trait attrayant de la ville. Autour de la rivière Hai, dans ce qui est considéré comme le centre-ville historique, l'urbanisme est à taille humaine. À Tianjin, les routes et les ponts sont également conçus pour les piétons qui recherchent un lien émotionnel avec ce qui les entoure, et non point  uniquements des passages empruntés dans la vitesse.

En marchant le long de la rivière Hai qui s’écoule lentement, on comprend pourquoi Tianjin est connue comme la ville des ponts. Et, alors que l'on continue la marche et la méditation, la ville apparaît  faite pour la communion des esprits, l’échange des cultures et pour que le passé résonne dans le futur.

Ses échos accueillants persistent longtemps après votre départ, comme s'ils invitaient le visiteur à revenir physiquement ou métaphoriquement à travers les chemins du souvenir.

David Gosset, sinologue, est le fondateur du Forum Europe-Chine (2002).

Tianjin : deux pays, un cœur

Les relations entre l'Italie et la Chine ont une très longue histoire qui remonte au marchand vénitien Marco Polo et aux missionnaires Matteo Ricci et Matteo Ripa, pour ne citer que quelques-uns des personnages historiques les plus célèbres. Lorsque nous parlons des échanges commerciaux et culturels entre les deux pays, il est impossible de ne pas mentionner la Route de la Soie, ce couloir sans fin qui a commencé à Chang'an, l'ancienne « ville de la paix perpétuelle » et s'est terminée à Rome, la légendaire « ville éternelle ». Il serait également impossible de parler de l'amitié entre l'Italie et la Chine sans mentionner la soie, les épices et tous ces produits qui ont permis à la Route de la soie de devenir une légende et de laisser sa marque dans le monde.

La soie semble être le fil qui relie l'amitié entre l'Italie et la Chine. Si nous voulons nous rapprocher de notre époque sur une chronologie imaginaire, les relations entre l'Italie post-unification et l'empire chinois ont officiellement commencé en 1866, lorsque le capitaine de frégate Vittorio F. Arminjon a été invité à se rendre en Chine et au Japon en mission diplomatique. Le but principal de cette mission était de fortifier les entreprises commerciales italiennes, à commencer par l'industrie de la soie, l'industrie éponyme qui a donné son nom à la Route de la Soie.

Dans le contexte des relations commerciales internationales, Tianjin a toujours joué un rôle important dans l'économie de la Chine du nord pour trois raisons principales, la première étant sa fonction stratégique en tant que port commercial et militaire, fonction qu'elle a conservée jusqu’à maintenant. Un autre facteur qui a permis le développement de la ville est sa proximité avec la capitale, surtout après que les Britanniques ont ouvert le premier chemin de fer à Pékin en 1897. Enfin, le passage de la section nord du Grand Canal dans le centre-ville : sa construction a commencé pendant la dynastie des Sui, et son existence a même été mentionnée par Marco Polo, qui a personnellement visité Tianjin et l'a nommé la « ville céleste ». Le Grand Canal était, et est toujours, le plus long canal artificiel entièrement navigable au monde. Par conséquent, il a joué un rôle crucial dans le transport des marchandises du port de Tianjin vers le reste de la Chine, en particulier vers la capitale, située à 160 kilomètres de la mer. Par conséquent, la ville de Tianjin est particulièrement importante aux yeux de ses partenaires et amis italiens, puisque l'Italie est célèbre dans l'imaginaire collectif en tant qu’une « nation de navigateurs ».

Au début des années 1900, Tianjin était une ville très connue, à tel point que nous pouvons trouver des descriptions et des appréciations dans les écrits de nombreux militaires, marchands et voyageurs italiens. Il y a quelques années, par intérêt personnel, j'ai décidé d'approfondir la recherche sur les Italiens qui ont vécu à Tianjin. C’est ainsi que j’ai découvert les lettres de Giuseppe Messerotti Benvenuti, médecin militaire et lieutenant envoyé en Chine pour ouvrir un hôpital italien à Pékin. Le lieutenant Messerotti Benvenuti, né dans la province de Modène, comme moi, avait visité Tianjin, la ville où je vis depuis de nombreuses années, plus de cent ans avant moi. Que pouvait-il penser de cette ville ? Messerotti Benvenuti connaissait bien Tianjin avant d'y arriver : « Tianjin est une ville beaucoup plus grande et plus belle que Pékin, alors que cette dernière n'atteint pas 500 000 habitants, Tianjin en passe 900 000 ». Au début de son voyage, le lieutenant en savait peu sur la Chine, son peuple et sa culture. Pourtant, l'année passée entre Tianjin et Pékin a sans aucun doute été d'une grande aide pour découvrir sa beauté et sa grandeur. À plusieurs reprises, il a répété que les Italiens avaient beaucoup à apprendre auprès des Chinois.

Au fil des siècles, combien d'Italiens ont ressenti les sentiments de respect et d'amour décrits par le lieutenant ? Ce nombre est sans doute inestimable, et ce n'est certainement pas un hasard : au fil du temps, Tianjin a été le centre de l'amitié entre l'Italie et la Chine. L’une des principales raisons de cette amitié se trouve dans l’ancienne concession italienne de Tianjin.

La concession italienne, fondée en 1902, était connue localement comme la « concession aristocratique » grâce aux grands efforts de Vincenzo Fileti, administrateur entre 1912 et 1920, et de ses successeurs. Célèbre pour ses villas majestueuses et ses jardins verdoyants, des années 1920 aux années 1940, elle a été le cœur battant des relations amicales entre l'Italie et la Chine, ainsi que l'un des lieux de résidence préférés de nombreux intellectuels et personnalités chinoises. De nombreux bâtiments montrent les traits typiques de l'architecture italienne de la première moitié du XXe siècle. Grâce à l'aide du gouvernement chinois, nous pouvons encore aujourd'hui admirer ces magnifiques bâtiments.

L'ancienne concession italienne, désormais rebaptisée « Zone au Style Italien », a retrouvé son ancienne gloire grâce au processus de restructuration entamé en 2004 par le gouvernement chinois et le groupe italien Sirena. Le projet italo-chinois a porté sur la rénovation d'une vingtaine de façades des 80 immeubles actuellement présents afin de donner un nouvel élan au commerce et au tourisme dans ce quartier de la ville. La visite du président de la République italienne de l'époque en Chine, Carlo Azeglio Ciampi, en décembre 2004, a également été essentielle, car il a eu l'occasion de visiter l'exposition Road to Tianjin : One Thousand years of relations between Italy and China (Chemin vers Tianjin : Un millier d'années de relations entre l'Italie et la Chine) qui s'est tenue à l'Institut italien de Culture à Pékin.

Grâce à ce nouvel élan et à l'étroite collaboration entre les gouvernements des deux pays, l'unique Zone au Style Italien est devenue un lieu populaire parmi les entrepreneurs chinois et internationaux. Même le célèbre réalisateur Giuseppe Tornatore l'a choisi comme décor pour ouvrir un club de cinéma nommé après l’oeuvre qui lui a valu l'Oscar du meilleur film en langue étrangère: Nuovo Cinema Paradiso.

Aujourd'hui, lorsque nous nous promenons dans les rues de ce beau quartier, nous nous sentons comme en Italie, sur le tournage d'un des films de Tornatore. La Zone au Style Italien est sans aucun doute l'un des points de repère du tourisme de Tianjin, un élément qui prend encore plus d'importance cette année. 2020 marque deux étapes importantes dans l'histoire des relations entre la Chine et l'Italie. Non seulement l'Année de la Culture et du Tourisme a été inaugurée le 23 janvier, mais les deux pays s'apprêtent également à célébrer leur 50e anniversaire depuis l'établissement des relations diplomatiques entre la République italienne et la République populaire de Chine plus tard en novembre.

En cette année particulière, tragiquement marquée par l'épidémie du COVID-19, pendant les longues journées de quarantaine, chaque membre de la communauté italienne de Tianjin pense à la Zone au Style Italien. Dès que les mesures de sécurité ont été levées, nous avons enfin pu mettre le pied dans cette Zone pour savourer ses couleurs, ses saveurs et ses parfums et retourner, ne serait-ce que pour une courte période, dans notre bien-aimée Italie. Quand ma ville natale me manque, comme les nombreux autres Italiens qui ont décidé de faire de Tianjin leur résidence permanente, je vais dans la zone de style italien. Ce lieu célèbre est un endroit apprécié des touristes et des résidents, qu'ils soient chinois, italiens ou d'autres nationalités : c'est l'endroit idéal pour manger une bonne pizza, savourer une tasse de café sur les tables en plein air ou admirer les beaux bâtiments. Il y a tellement de beaux endroits dans cette petite région qu'il serait impossible de choisir les plus beaux. Cependant, il y a un endroit à ne pas manquer : la Piazza Dante. Pourquoi cette « piazza » est-elle si unique ? Tout d'abord, pour son nom : le mot « piazza » suffit pour éveiller de beaux souvenirs dans le cœur de chaque italien, et si l'on ajoute l'hommage à Dante, notre grand poète national, le résultat est parfait. La deuxième raison est ce qui ressort au centre de la Piazza Dante : la statue de la Victoire ailée, reconstruite pendant le processus de restauration de la zone. La statue en marbre est merveilleuse, mais il y a un élément qui la rend encore plus spéciale et incarne la véritable essence de l'amitié entre l'Italie et la Chine : la déesse qui nous protège d'en haut porte une brindille d'olivier, symbole de paix par excellence. Y a-t-il un meilleur souhait que la paix ?

La Zone au Style Italien incarne parfaitement plus de 1000 ans d'amitié entre la Chine et l'Italie. Tout comme le missionnaire italien Giuseppe Castiglione est connu pour avoir fusionné l'Est et l'Ouest dans ses œuvres, la Zone au Style Italien de Tianjin combine l’architecture et le design de la région de Versilia avec la vibrante culture chinoise. Le résultat est l'exemple parfait d'une ville au profil inclusif, international et multiculturel. Inclusion, multi-culturalité et communication culturelle sont les valeurs fondamentales que nous essayons d'enseigner chaque jour aux étudiants du département d'italien de l'Université de Nankai, un autre des éléments qui relient Tianjin à l'Italie. Nous prenons notre mission très au sérieux car nous pensons que l'éducation est le moyen de construire un monde meilleur. Alors que nous racontons à nos étudiants l'histoire fascinante de l'amitié entre la Chine et l'Italie, nous les encourageons à devenir des ambassadeurs des deux cultures, précisément comme Tianjin l'a fait pendant plus d'un millénaire.

Inspiring Shanxi introduces the Province of Shanxi.
The book will be published in 2023.

Limited Views on the Chinese Renaissance constitutes an introduction to China.

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